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CALIFORNIA Is

TIVENESS CHALLENGE

This report examines the nature of the competitiveness challenge facing
California. analyzes its causes.
strategies for meeting the
is section provides an overview of the major findings of tne
challenge.
report.

Ca1ifornia
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Declining Competitive Advantage

been losi
its competi ve advantage in key industries
since the early 1970s. Because industrial competitiveness is not an end in
itself but rather
means for achieving a high standard of living, this
threatens the economic well
of every Californian. In short, the'loss
of competitiveness wi 1 reduce Cali
ia's standard of living. Reversing
this trend 11 take
effort by both the private and public
sectors.
California

tiveness s revealed most vividly in the
growi
ance
California•s exports and imports (Figure 1)
the imbalance only highlights a problem with much longer term, deeper root
in Cali rnia's declini
productivity advantage.
causes refl
(P
ty advantage is
comparison
productivity in California
relative to the United
tes average.)
perior productivity--measured in
terms
ue added per produc on hour--has been a key source of
California's comparative advantage.
productivity advantage is eroding
in key industries.
While

loss

Competitiveness is the ability to produce goods and services that meet
the test of international
le simultaneously maintaining and
expanding real incomes for resi
Productivity plays a central role in
l
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Aerospace--While defense spending has promoted the growth of this
sector, California is losing its ability to compete in commercial
aircraft. Californta•s share of commercial jet deliveries declined
from 41.5% of the total market in 1972 to 21.1% in 1982 and
productivity advantage in aerospace eroded from 28% in 1972 to 22%
in 1982. The industry may thus be vulnerable to the next slowdown in
defense spending.
Finance--Deregulation and interstate banking have created great
turbulence in this industry. While some institutions are doing
poorly and others are taking advantage of the new environment,
overall the productivity of California•s financial industry has
lagged behind that of the rest of the nation. In 1972, California
gross profit per employee (an equivalent measure to productivity)
was 8.3% less than the U.S. average. By 1982, that disadvantage had
widened to 10.2%.
What is especially troublesome about the declining productivity
advantage of key California industries is that California lost ground to a
U.S. national average in productivity which has been significantly lagging
behind productivity growth in other major industry countries. Between 1977
and 1982, U.S. manufacturing productivity grew by only 0.6% compared to 3.4%
in Japan, 3.0% in Frar.~e, and 2.1% in West Germany. While productivity
growth in the United States improved in 1983, registering a 4.2% gain
nationally, this was still behind Japan (6.2%), France (6.1%), and Germany
( 4. 6%}. In sum, while the United States has a major productivity growth
problem, key industries in California have been losing ground to the rest of
the United States.
Overall, the basic finding of the analysis can be summarized as
follows: while California industry is still a world leader in the invention
of new technologies and the development of new products, it is falling
behind in the application of technologies in production and the marketing of
these products in global markets. It is losing the race in manufacturing
and marketing high value added products.
A recent, vivid example of this can be found in video casette
recorders (VCRs). While the basic technology was invented and patented by a
California-based firm, Japanese firms have totally captured this rapidly
growing market. No VCRs are manufactured in the United States. Over half
of the VCRs made in Japan are built for the U.S. market.
6
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There is a critical relationship between California's industrial
competitiveness and its human resources. Competing through higher value
added production based on advanced manufacturing will require a skilled and
flexible workforce. Projections of California's future workforce indicate a
higher percentage of minorities and i~nigrants who will need significant
investments in education and training to be able to fully participate in the
more competitive economy. Without major attention to enhancing human
resource quality. California's ability to compete effectively in the global
economy may be constrained.
A competitiveness strategy for California thus consists of three basic
elements:
Applying technology for value-added production--using process
technologies to achieve flexible manufacturing. Initiatives in this
area might include establishing Centers for Manufacturing
Competitiveness as university/industry consortium partnerships,
forming Manufact~ring Engineering Centers of Excellence at
universities, and encouraging the development of shared flexible
manufacturing facilities to provide common production centers for
severa 1 sma 11 and r.1edi urn sized firms.
Enhancing worker productivity and adaptability--increasing the
skills, flexibility and commitment of the work force. Initiatives
in this area might focus on basic skills training, retraining and
adjustment assistance, and improving labor-market matching efforts.
Exganding markets--promoting export markets and stimulating import
su stitution. Initiatives in this area might include export
promotion, especially for medium-sized and small businesses. and
regional networks to increase linkages between major producers and
small business suppliers.
The report suggests specific actions that can be taken to promote each
of these areas. In summary, California needs to focus on building its
manufacturing capacity through investments in technology and human resources
and expanding the markets for California products. The state can target
critical investments in the areas of technology, human resources, and market
development while the ~rivate sector must continue its historic role of
innovation and entrepreneurship if this strategy of competitiveness is to
succeed. A creative partnership is needed based on a shared vision of what
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An overview
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compe tiveness
ems. Hi
ca11y. the state•s economy has grown
rapidly, stimulated by a series of five industrial 11 Surges" fueled by gold,
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ics. As California made tne
transition from a resou
to a technol
economy, each surge
was based on innovation
entrepreneurshi
willingness of the private
sector to take
of opportunities and engineer new solutions.
From
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limited--water was 1i
major

be an innovation-based economy
ve
in some key areas were
, much of the state was desert or desert like,
ifornia has had a history of
through investments first in
, railroads
) and later in education
higher education). Largely because of
ally in
on and technology, California was
of opportunities
by the development of the
ics i
and after World War II.
es
i

a
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and

investments
aeros

Foll
d
II, Califo a became the ~vorld's foremost advanced
technology economy. The state
more workers employed in high technology
manufacturi
industries. more scientists and engineers, and a higher
percen
ue added in high-techno1
production than any other
state. Both Silicon
Southern lifornia have become leading
high-technology regional
usters linking major producers with suppliers and
s
ce support
es.
usters have provided exceptionally

n

good environments for entrepreneurship and innovation. By 1980, high
technology manufacturing maintained over 3,700 business facilities with a
total payroll of $6 billion and 400,000 workers, or 23% of the state s total
manufacturing labor force.
1

The growth in high technology manufacturing has stimulated the growth
of financial and business services in support of these growing industries.
Together high technology manufacturing and finance have been the fastest
9rowing industries in term of employment (Figure 3). High technology has
also driven the growth of exports and value added in California. The three
leading manufacturing exports in California are transportation equipment
(largely aircraft), nonelectrical machinery (largely computers and office
equipment) and electrical equipment (communications equipment and
electronics components). In terms of value added, the leading industries in
1981 were electronic equipment ($10.6 billion), transportation equipment
($10.3 billion), and nonelectrical machinary ($8.2 billion). These were
followed by food products ($7 billion), fabricated metals ($3.9 billion),
printing and publishir.g ($3.6 billion) and instruments ($2.9 billion).

The Loss of Manufacturing Capacity
In recent years, California S innovation-based advanced technology
economy has been losing its manufacturing capacity. While the state S
industries have continued to design and develop new technology-based
products, the manufacturing and production activities have been shifting
away from California to other states and offshore. Hence, the state has not
been capturing the full economic (value added and employment) benefits of
its research. This has been due in part to the search for lower production
costs. It also appears to ue due to a lack of innovation and investment in
manufacturing process technologies.
1

1

Evidence of this loss of manufacturing capacity can be found not only
in California•s ioss of production in basic industries such as automobiles
and steel (as described in Section V) but also in high technology
manufacturing, the key source of growth in the past two decades.
12
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Increasingly. high technology manufacturing has been leaving Silicon Valley
as the area becomes more of a research and development center. In recent
years, new production facilities have been built outside of Silicon Valley
in such areas as Texas, North Carolina, and Oregon as well as offshore. On
the other hand, major high technology companies are opening research labs in
Silicon Valley.
One important way to look at the problem facing California is the
product life cyle, consisting of several key stages: basic research, applied
research, product development, manufacturing, and marketing. * · In terms of
the product life cycle, California has continued to be a world leader in the
product research and product development phases but appears to be lagging in
the manufacturing and marketing phases. The product lifecycle is breaking
down not in the area of innovation but in the area of production.
California is threatened on the one hand by foreign capture at the
front end of the cycle (e.g., licensing and commercializing our basic
research) and at the back end of the cycle (e.g., higher quality and lower
cost foreign manufacturing combined with aggressive marketing). While the
greatest present threat is from Japan, other countries and even other U.S.
states are becoming an equally important threat. The Japanesse have relied
on superior process technology rather than product technology to gain a
competitive advantage. Between 1950 and 1978, Japan acquired over 32,000
new technologies, mainly through licensing agreements with U.S. firms, for
approximately $9 billion. The United States spent over $500 billion
developing that product technology. The Japanese invested in production
capacity (process technology), the ability to 1nanufacture technology
products, and superior marketing; they now own major high technology markets
in such areas as communications and semiconductors

*The following discu~sion of the importance of the product lifecyle to
understanding the Cal~fornia competitiveness is based on work by Regis
14cKenna, Chairman of the Industrial Competitiveness Task Force for this
project. See particularly his "Manufacturing Competitiveness and the
Life-Cycle of Innovation (1985).
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measure
imbalance in California's
One significant
product life cycle can be found in
ative investment in basic science vs.
technology applications in industry. This is illustrated when California is
compared to the United States and to other U S. regions on key indicators
for each area. On the following indicators reflecting commitment to
research, California leads
on· quali
of science and engineering
faculty, research articles per faculty member, and science and engineering
Ph.D. graduates. However, on indicators reflecting the application of
technology in manufacturing,
as industry R&D in universities and
industry•s own R&D, California lags the United States and especially the
Northeast and t4idwest regions (Figure 4). Part of this can be explained by
the high degree
government-supported R&D in California, most of which is
sponsored
the Defense Department and is not focused on industria 1 needs.
Another clear indicator of loss of manufacturing capacity can be found
in an analysis
ifornia's growth in manufacturing value added from 1977
to 1982 For 1 manufacturi
industries (including high technology and
aerospace), the relative contribution of capital to value added declined by
0.38% and the relative contribution of production workers declined by 9.09%.
ve contribution of nonproduction workers
On the other hand. the re 1
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o of nonproduction to production
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workers increased
22.5%. While this reflects the increasing importance
of research, design and development in California, its also clearly reflect
the decline in importance of produc on itself in the creation of value
added.
For example, one semiconductor firm in Silicon Valley that is
specializing in custom chips now fi
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the rest are engineers and scientists. The implications are that Silicon
Valley is increasingly becoming an R&D and design center; new products are
developed in Silicon Valley, then designs are sent to manufacturing
facilities outside the state.
Production, especially in advanced manufacturing remains critical to
California's economic future. Its loss will mean the loss of value added
for the state's economy and the loss of jobs. It is a fundamental
misperception to assume that a post-industria1 economy means a "post
manufacturing~~ economy.
While over 70% of all jobs in California are in
services and services remain the major source of jobs in the state, the
value added created by manufacturing pro vi des the basis for much of the
state's service growth in such areas as finance, insurance, real estate,
transportation, communications, and wholesale and retail trade. The
fastest growth in services in California from 1977 to l9ti2 was in business
services, which grew by 48%.
11

11

Recent research at the University of California at Berkeley suggests
that about 25% of services can be considered tightly linked .. to
manufacturing.* These include engineers and designers as well as
maintenance personnel for production facilities because many work on a
contract basis. Thus the estimate for the value of manufacturing, when
increased by these tightly linked services, would account for ~pproximately
50% of value added and 45% of employment nationally, and probably slightly
more for California.
11

Export industries act as an important driving force for the rest of the
economy through a set of important linkages. High technology manufacturing,
aerospace, and agriculture are the key export industries in California.
Basic manufacturing and financial services are also important export
industries.

* Based on research by Michael Barrus, Codirector, Berkeley Roundtable on
International Economics (BRIE) and member of the Industrial Competitiveness
Task Force for this project.
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These industries bring dollars into the state that: create jobs and income
in those industries; create demand from a network of small and medium-sized
suppliers in the region, and create demand for support services--both
business services and those that are tightly linked. The income generated
in all three areas creates demand for products and services from the core
economy of retail trade, construction, health services, entertainment.
While the majority of jobs are found in the small and medium size
businesses of the core economy, the driving industries have the dynamic
effect of bringing dollars into the state, which continues to create
additional jobs as the dollars are spent and respent by the support
industries and then the core economy. The total income and jobs created is
called the multiplier. The multiplier for driving export industries is
estimated to range from 2.0 to 3.5, depending on the sector. The higher the
value added, the greater the additional benefit generated. Hence a dollar
generated by the driving industries can generate up to 3.5 additional
dollars in the economy as it circulates through the support industries and
core economy. A dollar spent in the core economy does not have the same
multiplier effect (the multiplier is close to 1.0, meaning a dollar spent
here has little additional job creating impact). Hence, two important
economic development objectives for any state are (1) increasing the amount
of income flowing into the state by exporting goods and services that have
large portions of value added and (2) keeping as much income flow as
possible by increasing the number of linkages among driving and supporting
industries in the state.
Recent California Economic Experience
While the California economy was hit hard by the 1981-1982 national
recession, experiencing a net loss of manufacturing jobs and an overall
unemployment rate of 9.7%, it has grown faster than the U.S. economy since
then, largely as a result of the stimulus of defense spending in aerospace
and high technology manufacturing. One-fifth of the state•s employment
growth in 1984 was in aerospace, electronics, and defense-related
activities.
19

In 1985, however, the competitiveness of key California industries
began to be questioned. High technology manufacturing has been experiencing
its worst shakeout yet as a result of overcapacity and increasing foreign
competition. This year has seen a decline in high-technology manufacturing
employment in Silicon Valley for the first time. Agriculture continues to
be hurt by the effect of the overvalued dollar, which reduces exports.
Basic manufacturing continues to undergo a significant restructuring.
Finance is undergoing major changes as a result of deregulation and the
movement toward interstate banking. While aerospace continues to grow as a
result of the stimulus of defense spending, it may be affected by a leveling
off of defense spending. This raises the fundamental issues of where the
new sources of California economic growth will be.
This study is being done, therefore, at a critical time in California•s
economic hi story. The key question has become whether the state has capacity
in manufacturing and marketing to compete in higher valued products or will
it continue inventing new technology products that will be manufactured and
marketed outside the state. In other words, can California capture its own
R&D for benefit in the state through its production and marketing? The
answer to that question will have an important impact on wealth creation and
job generation in California in the next decade and beyond.
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III AGRICULTURE IN CALIFORNIA

Introduction
Agriculture's importance in the California economy is often overlooked
as the spotlight increasingly falls on the state's glamour industries. The
magnitude of the state's agricultural output is especially overlooked:
California is by far the nation's largest agricultural producer; it has
eight of the country's top ten agriculture counties (in value of
production). Fresno County alone has the largest agricultural production of
any U.S. county; its output even surpasses that of 20 states. California
agriculture is also a diverse industry producing a wide variety of
agricultural products and having many businesses involved in food processing
and in less direct support of the growers.
Also overlooked is the fact that high technology and advanced consumer
products are fast becoming as much a part of agriculture as they are a part
of the state's aerospace and electronics industries. Thus, agriculture
enjoys a natural fit in California•s overall economy. While the economic
fortunes of agriculture are receding at both the state and national level,
the fortunes of some of the more glamorous industries are also receding. In
this context, these conclusions emerge from the following analysis:
California agriculture has developed as a particularly strong
industry because of the state's natural resources but also for many
of the same reasons that California's aerospace and manufacturing
have grown strong such as product and process innovation (e.g., the
navel orange and the almond huller), and creativity (e.g.,
propagation of superplants by new cloning technology).

21

The industry is affected by many of the same internal and external
forces that are affecting most California industries {e.g .• the
strong dollar, high interest rates, foreign import barriers, stiff
foreign competition).
The solutions to the real and perceived problems of the agriculture
industry fall in many of the same categories as solutions to the
problems of other industries {especially improved marketing and
financing).
In short, despite the economic transformations under way in the world,
California's agriculture industry is now and can continue to be an integral
part of the state•s economic growth.

Background
California's fertile soil, temperate weather, and abundant low cost
labor of the late 1800s and early 1900s were natural advantages on which to
build a diversified agriculture industry. Early products included some
fruits and vegetables; however, California's early farmers and ranchers
concentrated mostly on producing basic commodity crops. Cattle, grains, and
feed corn were the primary products for the industry's first century,
although olives, dried fruit, and oranges were exported east as soon as
train service became reliable enough for shipping perishables.
Farmers, ranchers, and agricultural experiment stations were active
from the late 1800s on in trying to find the best crops and strains for
California conditions. By 1910, cotton was being tried in Palm Springs,
breeding new types of citrus was a craze, and travelers to other lands were
being urged to bring back seeds to try out. Between 1920 and 1930, basic
agriculture technologies gave way to more advanced technologies based on
irrigation, chemical fertilizers, and pest control. The state•s land grant
colleges and agriculture extension services were established, and begin to
institutionalize experimentation initially done by entrepreneurial
individuals like Luther Burbank. By 1950, California was not only feeding
much of the United States, but much of the world.
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Overview of Current Status
Table 1 shows that California's overall agricultural industry employment
in 1982 stood at about 275,000. The industry contributes about $50 billion
to the state's gross product of $500 billion. In this regard, agriculture is
the state's number one industry. Nationally, California accounts for about
50% of the U.S. cash receipts for fruits, nuts, and vegetables produced.
Figure 5 highlights other specific features of California's agriculture
industry.
Figure S(a) shows that net farm income has dropped somewhat since 198u,
down to about $3.3 billion in 1985. California•s share of U.S. agricultural
income, however, was 18.7% in 1982 compared with only 9.3% as recently as
1970. This is strong evidence that California agriculture has been
outperforming that of other states, even during the troubled 19~0s.
Figure S(b) shows California's farmers receiving little more for their
products in 1984 than they did in 1979. Depressed prices in the face of
increasing business costs is behind much, but not all, of the problem facing
farmers. Another part of the problem is shown in Figure 5(c). Land values
are dropping fast. This is troubling because as farmers need new
agricultural loans, the value of their primary asset is sinking.
The extent of foreign trade in California agricultural products is
significant. California ranks among the top three agricultural export
states. Of total farm acreage one out of three acres is reportedly producing
for export markets. In 1983, more than 20% of the state's farm income was
produced by export sales and agricultural exports totaled about $3 billion
(8% below 1982, which in turn was down 21% from 1981 ). This downward trend
is especially troubling at a time when the industry is increasingly relying
on exports for overall industry growth. For example, during the high growth
24
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SUMMARY OF

AFFECT

AGRICULTURE

Effects

External Factor
Trade

The strong dollar has hurt agricultural exports. Foreign
countries are aggressively competing wi
U.S. products.
System needs to respond faster to trade shifts.

Business
cycle

High interest rates have raised farming cost. While
agriculture remains in recession, however, California
is performing better than many other states due to its
specialty crops.

Federal
policies

Affected by federal farm support programs, trade agreements,
land-use and water policies, and monetary policy.
Inappropriate federal support price and production policies
encourage commodities at a time of diminishing demand.

Changing
markets

Trend away from commodity grain and beef products toward
higher value added specialty fruit and vegetable products
and food processing favors California. However, market
shifts also need new responses.
Effects

Internal Factor
Technology

Adoption of advanced crop and production technologies has
been a key to California's agriculture. The continued
adoption of new technologies (for irrigation, seeds,
hydoponics, sensors in farm equipment), especially for
medium and smaller operations, depends on attention to
grower needs for new kinds of financing and new crop
markets.

Human
resources

While university trai ng for farm management has been
excellent, there have been gaps n training for new
management skills, especially through voc-ag
training at community colleges.

Financial
capital

Serious debt problems limit ability of highly leveraged
operations to respond to change. New types of equity and
debt financing will help.

Management

Improved management throughout the system (not just growers)
is critical as agriculture restructuring continues and new
opportunities open for use
advanced technologies. Need to
train entrepreneurs to use technologies.
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Changing Markets--As export markets change, commodity products are
becoming less competitive, especi ly beef
grains. There are
clear trends toward higher-value-added products {e.g •• specialty
fruits and vegetables), and food processing (e.g., ready-to-cook/eat
products).
Responding to market changes includes such things as conforming to
common practice in selling to foreign markets (e.g., using 5-kilo
boxes instead of 23-lb lugs to sell table grapes in Europe), meeting
foreign regulatory demands (e.g., finding a substitute for
prohibited wooden boxes for shipping fruit to Australia, developing
a surer method for removing aphids from lettuce without fumigating
to allow sales to Japan), and meeting foreign taste stanaards (e.g.,
nectarines that are both high sugar and high acid for Asia, smaller
and more fl avorfu1 pistachios for several markets).
Trade--The high-valued dollar and high domestic interest rates have
hurt U.S. agriculture more than any other factor. This problem is
particularly severe at a time when foreign countries are becoming
more self-sufficient and, in some cases, more competitive exporters
of their own products (e.g., Australia. Thailand). Adding further
to this problem, some countries (e.g., Japan) are also subsidizing
their products. Trade opportunities do exist however (e.g., South
Korea, Thailand, Japan), but strategic and aggressive marketing is
required. In sum, even though world food demand is increasing, many
agriculture states are competing for fewer foreign market niches not
being filled by the countries themselves. While California is well
positioned for improvements in foreign trade situations {because of
past successes, a good understanding of new economic realities, and
its western-most location), for California to be ultimately
successful, the currently high-valued dollar must conform more with
the true value of other market currencies and interest rates must
moderate. However, market shares lost to other countries because of
the high dollar are unlikely to be regained fully. {The offsetting
factor is that Ca'l ifornia is able to grow many kinas of crops so
that, given enough market information for both growers and
middlemen, lost markets can be replaced by new ones.)

Internal Factors
These internal factors are significant in California:
Technology--Agriculture is going through an explosive adaptation to
key advanced technologies (e.g., computers, biotechnologies).
Opportunities still exist, however, for continuous adaptation to
existing technologies and development of new technologies (e.g., for
irrigation management, seed treatment, managing pesticide use,
advanced mechanization like sensors and robotics in farm
equipment). While California•s large operators may be leading the
30
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Human Resources--California' specialty crops are especially
sensitive to the need for timely harvesting. Advanced mechanization
is eliminating some, but not a11 need for semiskilled farm labor.
While the cost of farm labor is climbing, so is productivity. The
real need is
new types of managerial training, (not in how to do
the job but in how to use the information that is becoming
available) especi 1y in the area of marketing. New voc-ag
curricula at higher educational levels. especially in California's
community colleges would help growers learn about new financing
possibilities, new crops, new markets and new marketing techniques.
The state s land grant and community colleges need to establish
stronger relationships with the industry--particularly, shippers,
wholesalers,
stributors, who are often left out--and jointly
develop opportunities
more applied research and for more
programs in advanced
cultural marketing for grower coops as well
as vertically integra
corporate farms and independent middlemen
Using California's educational system to disseminate information
might so foster the development of new entrepreneurial ventures,
among packers as well as growers.
1

Financial Capital--Nationally, large operators and some small
operators are reiatively debt-free, but there are very serious
problems wi middle-sized. mostly family-run operations too small to
have competi ve economies of scale and too large to remain debt-free
in time of major recession. In California, however, the problems are
reportedly
large operators that took on heavy debt in the
expansionary 1
• Their problems also include depreciating assets
and, in serious cases, lenders now unable to continue carrying the
debt. There is a compelling need to identify new ways to share
financial
sk.
le there are some signs of urban capital flowing
to meet rural
, major initiatives are still needed to support new
equity and debt nancing methods. Falling land values are a serious
problem, however, as equity and collateral diminish.
Management--Management that
effective responses to market
changes may be the most significant area of opportunity. World demand
patterns are changing--old markets are closing (e.g., feed
commodi es) and new ones are opening (e.g., for new processed food
products). Both growers and middlemen/processors need new \'lays of
responding
those changes. In some cases direct marketing of
specialized
can be more successful than traditional marketing
approaches.
ifornia agriculture needs to undertake more
information shari
through workshops in specific products. Finally,
California s educational institutions must provide new academic
programs for
development of the industry's marketing skills.
1

Policy view--Traditionally, government has attended mainly to
problems of growers without seeing agri cu1 ture as a system. Thus,
technological improvements and applied research focused on any
portion of the system beyond the grower tend to receive less pub1 ic
sector attention. This often leaves the grower unable to change
because problems further on or earlier in the system have not been
addressed.
From the brief summary above, it is clear that California's agriculture
industry is affected by many of the same external and internal factors that
are affecting other industries in the state. But if one set of factors can
be said to be dominating the industry today it would be the following:
increasingly stiff foreign competition is developing at the same time that
the dollar is unusually strong, interest rates are high, and trade barriers
are developing (e.g., Japan has import quotas on oranges). California, it
will be argued, competes very well in domestic markets. The problem then is
California's decreasing competitiveness in foreign markets at a time when
California is increasingly an agricultural exporter.

Competitive Assessment
Domestic Competition--Products
Table 3 lists 29 major agricultural products for which California's
production currently leads the nation. Ca1ifornia S top ten products have
been capturing the same or a greater share of U.S. production since 198U.
1

California dominates all other agricultural states in high value
Qroducts. Where Wyoming is strong in sheep and wool production, and Iowa in
corn and other grains, these are relatively low value products in which U.S.
agriculture is losing (or has lost) its competitive edge overall with
foreign countries. California, always strong in basic agricultural
commodities, is increasingly moving "up-scale." Almonds, pistachios,
artichokes, asparagus, kiwifruit, and the like bring premium prices in
rapidly growing specialty markets. The advantage is not only that these
products bring high prices, but that these crops can be grown in only a few
32

Table 3
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS IN WHICH CALIFORNIA LEADS THE NATION
California Share of
U.S. Production (Percent)
1983
1980
CommoditX:
Prunes
Pistachios
Kiwifruit
Almonds
Olives
Pomegranates
Figs
Dates
Walnuts
Nectarines
Apricots
Broccoli
Grapes
Plums
Avocados
Processing Tomatoes
Lemons
Safflower
Cauliflower
Honeydew Melons
Strawberries
Lettuce
Celery
Peaches
Carrots
Onions
Alfalfa Seed
Nursery Products
Eggs

100.0%
100.0
100.0
99.9
99.9
99.9
99.9
99.8
99.0
97.2
95.7
89.9
88.9
88.4
95.3
84.9
79.8
75.0

100.0%
95.0

72.1

74.8
71.0
75.3
74.4

71.7
70.0
69.4
68.0
58.9
51.3
30.1
25.4
24.6
12.0

NA

95.0
95.0
95.0
65.0
65.0
95.0
95.0
96.6
95.3
91.6
100.0
73.3

NA
NA
NA

NA
66.4
53.0
78.4
39.7

NA
NA

California also leads the nation in the following commodities, although
information is not available for their shares of U.S. production:
artichokes, asparagus, Brussels sprouts, cantaloupes, casaba melons,
Crenshaw melons, cut flowers, garlic, green lima beans, jojoba, Ladino
clover seed, fresh market mushrooms, oriental vegetables, Bartlett pears,
Persian melons, persimmons, potted plants, and spinach.
Source:

Security Pacific National Bank
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areas in the world so that California•s competition is limited.
Nevertheless, specialty products are import sensitive and many developing
countries are producing one or more to earn foreign currency. Therefore,
California cannot afford to lose any more of its edge.

Domestic Competition--Processing
California's agriculture industry is not limited to specialty crops
characterized by high intrinsic value. The state also has a growing food
processing industry that is adding value to basic products like beef,
chicken, fruit, and vegetables. Meeting new demands for new, fast
preprocessed, precooked, prepackaged, 11 home-cooked" meals, California's food
processors are responding by, for example: breading, flavoring, and cooking
chicken parts; slicing and cooking french fried potatoes and onion rings;
and packaging all kinds of food products for today's microwave cooking.
At the same time, the state's traditional food processing industry is
not faring well. For example, ten fruit processing operations in California
have closed since 1981; exports of canned peaches, pears, and fruit cocktail
have declined, and imports have grown significantly. According to the
Agricultural Council of California, imported canned peaches are $2 a case
cheaper on the East Coast than California canned peaches.
Shipping technology is an area in which public sector R&D has been
scant. However, the deve 1opment of trade with southern hemisphere nations
could provide small but growing markets for California stone fruit, nuts,
and salad vegetables given methods of packing that would assure arrival in
good condition.
While university research aimed at pro vi ding a 1ong-shel f-1 ife product
in a lighter, easier to transport form (while retaining flavor) might make
California processed fruits coMpetitive once again, the food processing
industry is changing. Success in the long run is more likely in innovative
new processed food products than in new methods of processing traditional
34

products. Industry, university and government policy should be directed as
both new products and products for which there are signs of new demand, and
efforts should be made to leverage public financial support of the industry
(e.g., basic and applied research) to attract new private foreign and
domestic invesonents.

Foreign Competition
California is a significant producer of cotton, rice, almonds, oranges,
and grapes, with much of the production destined for foreign markets.
Exports of these five crops comprise 56% of all exports. Table 4 summarizes
California's comparative advantages, disadvantages, how these five crops are
faring now in foreign markets. and what future they face.
While export crops are being hurt by the high-valued dollar, each is
also being affected (although differently} by other factors. For example,
cotton exports are increasingly threatened as end-use markets for cotton are
leaving the United States for Far East locations. Many countries have
developed vertical integration in cotton; while California grows the raw
material, there is little textile production in the state. Shipping costs
offset much of the quality advantage of the California product. This fact,
coupled with an increase in worldwide cotton acreage, is likely to cause
cotton exports to decline over the next few years. One big California
cotton co-op is predicting that 10% to 20% of the state's cotton growers may
go out of business next year. Whatever the actual outcome, it seems likely
that next year will see a permanent cut in cotton production.
Almonds are a specialty crop for which California faces competition
from i~diterranean countries, far from growing markets in Southeast Asia.
Domestic almond prices have dropped from their 1979 peak of $1.90 lb to
$1.20 or less. A 2-year oversupply of almonds is exacerbating the already
serious problem. Oranges have been affected by EEC arrangements and by
quotas imposed by Japan to protect their filandarin orange industry which
competes domestically and in Southeast Asian markets. The outlook is for a
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Table~

AAJOR CAlifORNIA CROPS IN
fOREIGN COMPETITION
1984

Percent Exported
(Value of Total Value)

Expected
Trend

Ex~rt

Prhtary
Mllrkets

Prtaary
C!!!ee t 1tor

C0111peti ti ve
Advanta:ze

C0111petlthe
Dlsadvanta:ze ___

Cotton

70-800:

Down

Japan, other
Pacific Ri111,
Russia, PRC

PRC, Russia

High quality product

End-use markets leaving
U.S., over-valued dollar,
competitors improving
production quality,
worldwide cotton acreage
increasing.

Almonds

50-60

Down

W. Genaany,
Japan, Taiwan,
S. Korea

Spain, Italy

Ideal growing conditions,
high quality product,
product variety.

Over-valued dollar, Spain
expect admittance into EEC
could hurt California
producers..

Oranges

30

Flat

Worldwide,
Japan, other
Pad fie Rim

Mediterranean
countries

High quality product,
ideal growing conditions,
seasonal differences
make California oranges
attractive in European
markets, juice processors
in Cal fforn1a.

Over-valued dollar, Japan
has imposed trade barriers.

Grapes,
Raisins,
Table Wfne

12-15

Down

Hong Kong,
Singapore

G1-eece, Turkey,
Australia

Ideal growing conditions

Over-valued dollar, trade
barriers, EEC very
aggressive and surplus
very large.

Rice

40-45

Flat

Developing
Pacific Rim

Thailand,
Japan, Korea

Ideal growing conditions

Over-valued dollar, high
labor costs.

w

0">

mostly flat orange export market over the next few years. (Brazilian orange
juice competes mostly in eastern U.S. markets. and mostly with juice from
F1orida.)
California's grapes, raisins, and table wines increasingly compete with
products from Mediterranean countries and from Australia. The European
Common Market is also increasingly competitive (some observers speak of the
EEC "wine lake"), so that the outlook is for modest declines.
Finally, California rice is facing increasingly stiff competition,
especially from Thailand. It is likely that the state will lose export
market share through the end of the century.

Summary of Major Inter~ational Trade Problems
Confronting California Agriculture
These appear to be the major trade problems:
Overvalued Dollar--Raises cost to foreign countries that import U.S.
agricultural products, thus, limits demand. Lowers cost to U.S.
buyers of foreign food products, thus 1imi ti ng domestic demand for
domestic products. California•s dollar problem is more severe for
European currencies and markets than for Asian currencies and
markets.
Trade Barriers--California is facing both tariff barriers
(restrictive Japanese custom duties on citrus fruits) and nontariff
barriers (kiwifruit and walnut restrictions because of fumigants and
packaging employed by California producers).
Subsidies and Dumring--While the United States is attempting to
control this prob em through GATT negotiations, it is doing so
industry by industry, and with little hope of success. Agriculture
is not a priority at this time (the California fig industry faces
subsidized dried fig imports duty free at a price below domestic
costs of production).
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Overview
As with U.S. agriculture, California's agriculture industry is troubled
by macro factors that are affecting many industries today. But what is
particularly important are the trends in foreign trade. An increasing
foreign ability to compete in agricultural production for home use and for
export coupled with today•s overvalued dollar are hurting California
agriculture in ways not felt before. While California is blessed with ideal
growing conditions for many crops, higher quality products, and higher
overall yields, foreign competitors have the advantage of growing domestic
markets, less expensive labor, more government support, and direct trade
pro teet ion.
The difficult question is whether California•s inherent strengths
(geography, weather) alone can stem the export decline. As the dollar
weakens (as expected in late 1985 and 1986), exports might be expected to
rise; however, in many cases Third World countries will keep the markets
they gained while the dollar was high. The advantages held by foreign
countries may well outweigh California S advantages between now and the turn
of the century. Furthermore protectionist threats against U.S. products are
widespread today. It is possible that U.S. countermeasures to foreign
competitive practices (such as quotas or high import duties) will result in
foreign retaliation. If Pacific countries chose to retaliate by closing
their markets to U.S. goods (as was the experience when the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act of 1930 became law), California agriculture would be hurt. There
is also the threat that as some of the Pacific nations (especially Japan,
Korea, and Thailand) move to even more advanced production technologies,
these countries can begin to move their products into California's currently
captive export markets, permanently damaging California agriculture. State
1eaders must be aware of these threats and be a1ert to the fact that
California's specialty crops are increasingly sensitive to foreign
competition.
1

Will California's agricultural industry follow the path of California
steel, automobile and electronic industries? The answer lies in the extent
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to which California
ture becomes even more aggressive users of
techno 1ogy, new
new marketing, and advanced technology. Table 5
revisits the list
and internal factors affecting agriculture
discussed earlier. For each factor, Table 5 shows whether California is at
an advantage, a disadvantage, or is about at parity with the major foreign
competition. The table shows that the state•s Ag industry is at a distinct
disadvantge in terms of federal policy support (trade and fiscal policies
are hurting the industry) and high cost of capital (real interest rates are
causing problems for debt-laden operators). California is at an advantage
in terms of changing U.S. markets (the move to special high-value added
products by today 1 s "fashion eaters 11 and the newly diet-conscious consumer
is helping California), applications of product and process technology
(California is leading the world in labor-saving technology), new marketing
aproaches. and management (California is strong but there is still room for
improvement in accessing and using new types of information).
Table 5 can help serve as a guide for designing public policy,
education, and lobbying remedies for those areas where a significant
disadvantage exists and for developing further public policy support to
those areas characterized by parity or a si gni fi cant advantage.
At the same time,
ifornia could benefit even further by looking at
agriculture as a
of systems that include packers and shippers,
suppliers, lenders. and wholesalers, not just growers. In some cases,
advances need to be made in other parts of the system to allow growers to
1.1ake adequate responses to market changes.
Future Prospects
There are already some signs that segments of California's agriculture
industry are at the bottom of a deep cycle and are recovering. The Almond
Growers Exchange, for example, recently reported a 40% increase in 1985
exports and an 18% rise in domestic shipments. Much of this improvement
comes from innovative products such as almond butter (from 40,000 pounds in
1981 to 3 million pounds in 1985).
39

Table 5
KEY CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

vs

MAJOR FOREIGN
Disadvantage
Major
iHnor

CO~IPETITION

Advantage
i4ajor

t~inor

Parity

External Factors

-

Federal Policy
Changing t4arkets
Trade Pol i ci es

-

Internal Factors

- -

Technology
Process
Product
Human Resources

111111

Quality
Quantity

Cost of Capital

-

111111

~1anagement/Marketi ng

-
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These improvements, while encouraging, are not universal across all
products. Some products 1ike cotton and rice may be permanently damaged by
foreign advances. Where California has unique comparative advantages, such
as ideal growing conditions (e.g., kiwifruit, nuts), the now diminishing
dollar value, and moderating interest rates should improve economic
performance. Mobilizing political pressure against subsidies and dumping
practices (and threats of retaliation) may reduce these competitive
pressures~ but because foreign relations are so complex and other U.S.
interests may be involved (e.g., the need for U.S. banks to have Third World
loans repaid) such mobilization n~y not be feasible in all cases.
Overall, ,while there are positive signs, foreign countries are becoming
more self sufficient and able to compete effectively in international
agriculture trade. California•s edge in high value, specialized products is
likely to diminish slowly over the next 10 to 15 years. To keep the
industry•s overall economic performances at 1980 to 1985 average levels, or
better, will require research, and new products and processes only now on
the horizon. Aggressive and strategic marketing must accompany both new
breakthroughs and maintaining sales of today•s products. California can
maintain a viable agriculture industry by building on its most obvious
comparative advantage--the power of technology, creativity, and innovation.
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IV HIGH-TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURING IN CALIFORNIA

Introduction
High technology manufacturing in California has been an engine of
growth in employment and output in California manufacturing. Since World
War II, employment in high tech manufacturing has increased nineteenfold-from 18,355 in 1947 to over 350,000 in 1982. The most rapid growth has
occurred in communications, electronics, computers and office machinery, and
instruments.
California's success with high technology manufacturing and the growth
of such high technology regions as Silicon Valley have made California the
envy of the world. Today, however, there appears to be a slowdown in
leading high tech sectors in California because of foreign competition,
overcapacity, and decentralizatlon of the industry to other regions and
coun es.
California could become the "electronic rustbelt" of the 1990s unless
its electronic, computer, and communications industries are able to remain
at the forefront of new product and process innovation and development. The
question facing these sectors is how they can maintain their competitive
edge. Even if they find a way, however, the "electronic" industrial
revol
on is now well advanced and many of the current electronics
industries are becoming mature. California cannot stake its future on the
sources of past economic success. Instead, it should seek continuous
innovation and adaptation to new market opportunities in advanced
technologies.
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The primary key to
ifornia •s
c
lies in i
ability to
remain a seedbed
innovation across many
sti , emerging.
industries and to retain manufacturing capacity in
to-be-seen gh
these areas. To do so. the state must revitalize its ability to support
advances in technology, entrepreneurship, and human and capital resources.
It also needs to stimulate the emergence of tomorrow's high technology
industries which will ultimately be the source of new jobs and opportunities
in California in the 1990s and beyond.

The Emergence of California's High Tech Industrt
For California, World War II marked the turning point in the state's
transition from a resource-based economY to one based on advanced
technology. What spearheaded the drive to an advanced technology economy
was the phenomenal growth of increasingly sophisticated defense industries.
After the war, a number of major firms--Douglas, Northrop, Hughes--that had
supplied the war effort with aircraft and other advanced technology systems
from California continued to invent new technoloqies and develop ne\'1
products such as jets, missiles, radar, and lasers. The expansion of these
firms continued throuqh the Korean War. Between 1950 and 1954, military
prime contracts awarded to California firms totaled nearly $13 billion or
about 14% of an awards nationwide. In 1957, the launching of Sputnik
expanded and broadened the significance of nonmilitary space development.
Again, California was able to lead the way. In that year, employment in
aerospace topped 270,000.
Throughout this period, defense spending
ped to promote advanced
technology development, especially in the aerospace industry. At the same
time, the application of these technologies to commercial use was beginning
to increase. which led the way to the next phase of California's industrial
revolution.
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In
a
transi on
dominance by
aerospace i
a more versifi manufacturing sector, which began to serve
effectively commercial markets. While aerospace still accounted for over
34% of a11 manufacturing employment in 1965, the advanced technology
manufacturing base was broadening.
During the 1950s, a new nucleus of high technology activity was forming
in what was to become known as Silicon Valley. Several electronics firms,
such as Hewlett-Packard and Varian, had a1 ready been 1aunched in Santa Clara
County by engineers from Stanford University. However, it was not until the
mid-1950s when William Shockley, inventor of the transistor, and other
semiconductor pioneers came to Palo Alto that a critical mass of electronic
engineers and entrepreneurs collected in the area. The age of the
transistor and semiconductor arrived swiftly thereafter. In addition to the
growing number of transistor firms
continuing military market,
discovered a consumer market in the mid-1950s, first for portable radios and
hearing aids~ and then for computers. The computer market, which was
expanding rapidly, entered the Silicon Valley when 1Bt4 opened a research and
manufacturing plant in San Jose in 1956.
major change in the 1960s was the commercial application of the
i
ci
t--a central element in microelectronics. The first
integrated
rcuit was put into production in 1960 by Fairchild for NASA and
a variety of CO!l1l1erci al equipment manufacturers. 1 n 1962, the government
pu
100% of the integrated circuits produced in the United States. In
1965,
purchased 55% and by 1969 it was purchasing only 36%.
the 1960s, the transition from military to commercial
the
use was compl
1978, only 10% of integrated circuits were purchased
by
government.
The invention in 1969
the computer-on-a-chip known as the
c
the next round of growth in commercially driven
microel
ics. Between 1972 and 1982, the 30 or so chipmaking firms in
Silicon 11
grew to over 3,000 assorted firms who were by then offering a
wide varl ety of high technology products and services for conwerci al

markets--nearly 1 based on the integrated circuit
the c rocessor.
key point is that while defense procurement
an important role in
the birth of Silicon lley, it was the transi on to commerci . markets in
the 1960s and 1970s that sustained its growth.

High Technology Industry in California Todal
High technology manufacturing in California has been the most dynamic
and vital segment of the state's economy. In 1972, only 14.8% of
manufacturing employment was in high tech manufacturing (including computers
and office machinery, electronic components, communications equipment,
instruments, and drugs). By 1982, nearly one-fourth of all manufacturing
employment in the state was in high tech manufacturing. Table 6 shows the
growth in high tech manufacturing employment and value added from 1947 to
1982.
The growth of high technology industry has occurred in rather
specialized locations. i~ost high technology firms, early in their product
life cycle, have tended to cluster because of communication and innovation
economies. In California, two major high technology clusters have developed
in the Santa Clara Valley and one in Los Angeles and Orange Counties. A
high proportion of California's high tech manufacturing is concentrated in
these two agglomerations.
High tech manufacturing is likely to remain important to
ifornia
economy, particularly in electronics and solid state technology. These
technologies will also be central to the future modernization and survival
of older sectors, perhaps giving them a new lease on life in the face of
foreign competition wi
low-cost labor.
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Table 6
CAllFORNIA EMPLOYMENT AND REAL VALUE ADDED IN HIGH TECH MANUFACTURING,
1963-1982

Sector
Drugs

1963

Emelo,lment (in thousands)
1967
1972
1977

1982

3.7

n.a.

8.7

11.8

14.9

Computers

n.a.

n.a.

43.1

63.4

112.7

Communications

96.7

99

75.6

89.5

137.3

Electronics

45.8

59.4

53.2

85.2

135 1

Instruments

22.

33.3

48.1

69

91.8

n.a.

n.a.

228.7

318.9

491.8

Total

Sector

Real Value Added (in millions of 1972 dollars)
, 982
1967
1963
1972
1977

Drugs

62.1

n.a.

245.7

343.2

451.9

Computers

n.a.

n.a.

932.6

1,644.8

2,879.5

1,627.5

1 • 914. 5

1,535.3

2,033.3

3,324.4

Electronics

648.6

886.7

910.9

1,699.5

3,013.6

Instrumen

362.1

600.4

927.3

1 '384. 7

2,093.4

n.a.

n.a.

4,552.0

7,1Uti.5

Communica ons

tal

Source:

U.S. Cens~s of Manufactures, 1963-1982.
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Factors Affecting Development of High Technology
Manufacturing in California
Both external and internal factors shape the opportunities for high
technology manufacture in California.

Externa 1 Factors
While the high value of the dollar hurt exports of high technology
manufacturing, the major external factor affecting the industry was a
slowdown in world dema~d beginning in 1984. This was especially severe for
semiconductors: world demand actually dropped by 10.4% in the fourth quarter
of 1984. The rapid growth in demand for high techno.logy products in 1983
resulted in a build up of excess capacity in the high technology industries
which was not needed when purchases slowed down in late 1984 and 1985.
Major purchasers of high technology equipment slowed down their procurement
of new equipment in 1984 as they made inventory adjustments. This resulted
in slowdown of production and layoffs in many high technology firms. At the
same time, the Japanese began to gain an increasing share of the
semiconductor market. Furthermore, the Japenese became important in markets
once dominated by U.S. high technology manufacturers, especially in
communications equipment, instruments, and computers. These developments
appear to be cyclical in nature and should be corrected as demand increases
again.
The strongest external threat is the degree to which foreign
competitors are penetrating world markets and reducing U.S. market share.
The high value of the dollar has contributed to this problem. So have
focused Japanese efforts to penetrate specific markets in semiconductors,
communications, and instruments. However, external factors do not account
for all of the competitiveness threat. U.S. manufacturers must continue to
innovate in producing higher value added, quality products that meet
changing world demand. Thus we must examine factors critical to
competitiveness within the internal control of the industry itself.
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Beyond external factors, a
of critical factors internal to high
technology manufactu ng have a critical impact on future development. In
technology, while California remains the leader in the product innovation,
it is losing its lead in manufacturing process innovation, reflected in the
decline of Ca1ifornia s productivity advantage in critical industries such
as computers and office equipment Shortages of key technical personnel and
engineers are
cal problems in production improvements. The higher cost
of capital in the
ted States than in Japan places high technology
manufacturers at a comparative disadvantage in new capital investment.
Thus, several key internal factors are creating problems for California high
technology industries and their ability to produce competitively using new
process/manufacturing technol
es.
1

The Case of Semiconductors
The semiconductor industry provides a specific illustration of the
external and internal threats to competitiveness.
importance of
internal and external factors affecting this
e 7 swrmari zes
.)
rs are the basic building blocks for advanced
i
complex electronic circuitry possible with
ogy
possi e the development of advanced computers,
semiconductors
telecommunications equipment, a wide range of consumer electronics products,
11
industrial
Smart weapons. 11 Manufacturing and service industries
are increa
electronics ntensive, and semiconductors are the source of
a rising share
ue of such products as automobiles and
manufacturing equipment.
If California
the United States fall behind Japan in semiconductor
technology, surely the technological gap would extend to other fields. In
industrial machinery, for example, there is increasing use of
microprocessors and other electronic components. Were Japan to dominate
technological advances in semiconductors. Japanese robotics firms,
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TABLE 7
FORCES AFFECTING SEMICONDUCTORS
External
Trade

Concerns about barriers to Japanese markets and Japanese
"dumping 11 chips in American markets. (Japanese- share of
U.S.market increased from 7% in 1980 to 17.4 %in 1984, while
U.S. share of Japanese market was constant at 11.9%.)

Business
Cycle

Slowdown in world demand began in third quarter of 1984,
creating a downturn in the industry.

Federal
Policies

Extension of R&D tax credit important for technological
innovation. Concerns about tax reform proposal concerning
depreciation and tax treatment of international operations.

Changing
Markets

New uses for semiconductors critical for future growth
especially in automated manufacturing and communications.

Internal
Technology

Process technology improvement is critical for rapid changes
in product cycle and value-added production.

Human
Resources

Shortages of engineers and key technical personnel.
Quality improvements linked to human capital investment.

Financial
Capital

Cost of capital much higher than in Japan. Debt to equity
ratio much higher in Japan.

Management

Innovative management of technology is key; so is effective
human resources management.
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industri machine
from innovat1ons in desi

, and
and application.

d be the first to benefit

Overall. the trends do not look favorable. Despite the impressive
performance of the U.S. semiconductor industry in the 1960s and 1970s, U.S.
producers of semiconductors have been outperformed by the Japanese.
Japanese exports of total semiconductors surpassed U.S. exports to Japan in
1977. Integrated circuit imports from Japan surpassed exports to Japan in
1978. U.S. imports of metal oxide semiconductor (MOS) integrated circuits
from Japan surpassed U.S. exports in 1979. Japanese semiconductor makers
increased their share of the U.S. market from 7% in 1980 to 17.4% in 1984,
while the U.S. share of the Japanese market stagnated at 11.9%.
It is so expected that Japanese demand for semiconductors will
continue to grow more rapidly than American demand over the rest of this
decade. By the early 1990s, Japan could be the largest semiconductor market
in the world. In 1979, Japan•s market for semiconductors \'las only about a
U.S. market.
third of the size
This year, many chipmakers in the Silicon Valley continue to suffer
from extremely stiff international competition. The semiconductor industry
with a
ng erosion of its competitive position. Many
is
companies are closing production facilities in California or are shifting
production offshore while other firms are building new, highly automated
facilities within California. The most successful California semiconductor
rms are those that have been
e to remain in the forefront of advanced
ogy.
product life cycle in this industry averages 3-5 years.
Major semiconductor rms, faced with a rapid decline in the price paid
for commmodi
random access memory (RAM) chips, have been attempting to
meet the challenge of competition by shifting the production of much more
complex customi
i
One major California manufacturer, Intel,
recently announced it was withdrawing a1togther from the production of
commodity RAlvf chips and concentrating on high value added chips (e.g., logic
chips and erasable-programmable read-only memory, or EPROM, chips).

The Japanese have been more competitive in manufacturing chips than
California firms in part because they
a lower cost of capital in
Japan. This means that Japanese firms have been
e to make investments in
R&D and in new capacity at much higher levels than California firms and thus
can overcome the rapid obsolescence of semiconductor products and production
technologies. The major difference is that Japanese companies raise their
money from banks while U.S. firms raise money on the stock market which
emphasizes short-term profitability. Consequently, Japanese capital
investment has averaged 27.6% of sales since 1980, against U.S. investment
at on 1y 17. 4%.
The U.S. semiconductor industry must find a way to keep profits high in
order to raise money. Many industry leaders maintain that the only way they
wili be able to successfully compete in the future is to penetrate the
Japanese market. And to do so, they need U.S. government pressure on
trading relationships with Japan. At the same time. semiconductor firms
must continue to concentrate on improvements in both product technology and
process manufacturing to capture increasing shares of the higher value,
customized part of markets. This emphasis on both trade and
higher-value-added production is remarkably similar to the key ingredients
for agricultural competitiveness.

Competitive Assessment
How competitive California's high technology manufacturing has been is
based on how we 11 manufacturers have performed in the domestic and
international markets. The competitiveness of California's high tech
industry relative to that of other states can be measured using three
methods. First, simple measures of California's share of U.S. employment
and value added in high tech manufacturing and the relative California U.S.
growth rates in value added by high tech manufacturing reflect the
comparative advantages of plant location in California. Second,
productivity in Ca1ifornia s high tech manufacturi
industries can be
compared with that for the nation as a whole. Obviously, California's
1
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productivity advantages in high tech manufacturing help to explain the
overall growth of the industry in California. Third, the export performance
of high tech industry in California can be compared with that of the nation.
In the international economy, California's high tech competitiveness
can be inferred by examining the relative share of U.S. high tech
manufacturing exports.

California's High-Tech Competitiveness in U.S. Markets
The competitiveness of California's high tech manufacturing within the
domestic economy becomes evident by examining California's increasing share
of national employment and output in these industries. Since World War II,
California's share of both national employment and value added has increased
dramatically. ln 1947, California's share of national high tech
manufacturing employment was a mere 2.5%. By 1972, California's share was
14.5%; and in 1982 it had increased to 21.3%. California was the vortex of
the electronics and computer revolution.
In i
dual high tech industries, California's dominance in high tech
manufacturing is most pronounced in computers and office equipment,
electronics, and communications equipment. The state's share of U.S.
employment in computers rose from 3.9% in 1947 to nearly 28% in 1982. In
communications equipment, California's share climbed to 22.9% in 1982. In
electronic components and parts, California's share of national employment
in the industry rose from 10.1% in 1963 to 26.2% in 1982. California's
shares of national employment in instruments and drugs have increased at a
much slower pace than the shares in computers, electronics, and
communications. In instruments and drugs, California's shares of national
employment in 1982 were 14.7% and 9.0% respectively.
The competitiveness of California's high tech manufacturers is also
reflected in a comparison of the growth rate of output of high technology
manufacturing in California against the output for the nation. The growth
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rate of
value added in California hi
tech industries clearly exceeds
that of gh tech producers for
on as a whole. Between 1977 and
1982, the average annual real growth rate in
ue added in California high
tech industry (10.1%) nearly doubled the U.S. growth rate in these
industries (5.1%}.
Another way to gauge the competitiveness of California's high tech
manufacturing, however. is to compare the productivity of high tech
industries in the United States overall with
in California.
Productivity is measured in terms of dollars of manufacturing value added
per paid hour of production work.
Ca1ifornia S electronics and communications equipment industries have
maintained a strong productivity edge over producers elsewhere in the United
States since 1963, remaining on average 15% to 20% more productive.
1

On the other hand, California 1 S productivity advantage in computers and
office machines has eroded from an 11.6% advantage in 1972 to a 7.2%
disadvantage in 1982.
The shifts in production facilities out of
California reflect this erosion in California s productivity advantage in
computers.
California has never had a productivity advantage in drug or instrument
manufacture. California's instrument producers are coming close to matching
the productivity of instrument makers nationwide. In 1982, California s
productivity gap in instruments dropped to 6.9%. In drugs, however,
although California s productivity disadvantage is declining, it remains
substantial. California drug manufacturers were only two-thirds as
productive as their national counterparts in 1982.
1

1

Overall, as shown in Table 8, California has a productivity
disadvantage in computers, instruments, and drugs and has not gained
significant advantage in communications and electronics.
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Manufactu
in li
ia have grown rapidly in recent years.
In 1981 California was the largest producer
manufactured exports among
the 50 states, with export shipments totaling an estimated $18.8 billion,
representing 11.4% of total U.S. exports of manufactures.
technology exports in 1981. The
California so 1 the nation in
of electric equipment, most
state ranked first na onally as an expo
notably in electronic components and communications equipment; second in
nonelectrical machinery and instruments; and third in transportation
equipment.
California hi
tech industry has increasingly focused its marketing
efforts on international ma
• pa cularly the expanding Pacific Rim.
As output in ectronics computers, instruments have grown, so have
international
rts. Table 9 shows the increasing importance of exports
in
gh technology sectors (data available only at the 2-digit SIC level).

el

Since 1970,
c

rtation equipment, nonelectrical machinery, and
been the most important California exports. From
es to foreign countries were valued in 1981
i
es
one.
2 bi lion or more
three-fifths of the state total.

a

t. California exports constituted 14.5% of
transpo
on equi
'
S. exports;
on
were heavily concentrated in
ai
Nonel ectri
nery showed the most rapid growth among
a's top three
sing 64% in real terms from 1977 to 1982.
ce machines were the most significant export in this
i
c machinery exports--mostly electronic components and
communications
pment--increased
50% in real terms from 1977 to 1982.
I

The

manu

interna onal
res can
in

u.s.

tiveness of California's high tech
by 1 ing at the U.S. share of world exports.
lance in hi
technology manufactures has remained

Table 8
CALl FORtH A'S PRODUCTIVITY ADVANTAGE IN HIGH TECH
MANUFACTURING, 1963-1982
(Percentage above or below U.S. average)
Sector

1963

Drugs
Computers

1967

1972

1977

1982

-15. a

n.a.

-43.5%

-37.6%

-33.8%

n.a.

n.a.

11.6

0.5

-7.2

Communications

19.9

30.9%

21.9

19.0

23.8

Electronics

23.5

44.5

12.5

17.0

15.7

Instruments

-14.3

-l o. 7

-14.7

-11.9

Source:

U.S. Census of Manufactures, 1963-1982.

Table 9
CALIFORNIA EXPORTS AS PERCENT OF TOTAL PRODUCTION
IN SELECTEU SECTORS, 1972-1982
1972

Transportation

6.3%

1977

1982

13.7%

18.1%

Nonelectrical Mach.

10.8

19. 1

23.1

Electric equipment

7.3

14.0

15.2

Instruments

6.3

20.0

20.5

Total Manufacturing

4.5

7.5

9.8

Source:

U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade
Administration, State Export Series, 1984.
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-6.9

posi

ve

it is shri

in
high techno 1

and
surplus

It peaked in 1981 at $23.6 billion
Partial year data
cate that the U.S.
all of 1984 may fall to less than

$5 bill ion.

Although the United States remains by far the leading exporter of high
technology manufactures, the decline in U.S. market share shows that other
nations. particul
Japan, are increasi y competitive with the United
Sta
Japan S share of the industrial countries exports of high
technology products more than doubled between 1965 and 1982 to reach 17.3%.
Japan dominates the export market for communications equipment and
electronic components.
1

1

Computers--In office,
ng, and accounting machines, U.S. exports
grew at an average annual com~ound rate of 19.2% between 1965-1982. The U.S.
share of total exports. grew slightly from 32% to 36.6% during this period.
Japan recorded the fastest rate of growth among the major U.S. competitors,
averaging a 31% annual rate of increase between 1965 and 1982. Japan's
share of total exports rose from 3% in 1965 to 17.% in 19~2. The emphasis
aced on
industry by the Japanese government will make it
r the United States to maintain or improve its
ncreasi
is market. The
ted States kept its lead in this
high
largely because of its strong position in computers
and
equi
U S. market share in the other office equipment
in the overall grouping was generally much lower than in computers.

Communications Equipment and Electronic Components--Japan is the
d's 1
ng supplier in communications equipment and electronic
ts. Japan's exports in this group grew at an annual average rate of
22.4%
and
During this period, Japan's share of total
rose
16.
36.6%.
pments by the United States grew much
more slowly.
a 17.
per year increase. The U.S. share of total
slightly from 20.3% to 21% between 1965-1982. The
ora ng .S. share in is product group can be traced to weak

performance in the two largest sectors: telecommunications equipment and
electron tubes, transistors, and semiconductors.
Instruments--Japan has overtaken the United States as the world S
leading exporter of professional and scientific instruments. Japan's
exports averaged a 21.8% annual growth rate from 1965 to 1982 with strong
performances in photographic and motion picture equipment and supplies and
in medical instruments. During this period, Japan's share of total exports
rose from 8.6% to 21.9%. U.S. exports of instruments grew at 14.4% per year
over the same period. U.S. market share of total exports declined from
24.9% to 21.8% during this period. California•s exports of instruments grew
at an annual average rate of 24.8% between 1969 and 1981, which was higher
than the comparable growth rate of the United States (16.0%) but lower than
that of Japan, 25.1%.
1

Drugs--U.S. exports of drugs grew at an annual average rate of 13.4%
from 1965 to 1982. In contrast, those of the other suppliers grew at an
annual average rate of 14.9%. Export shares are relatively unchanged over
this period. However, in 1981, the United States recaptured its position
from Germany as the leading world exporter of drugs.

Summary of Competitiveness Assessment
While California's high technology manufacturing has expanded rapidly
in terms of both employment and value added, it is facing increasing
competitive threats. California•s productivity advantage has eroded in
computers and office equipment and has not grown significantly in either
communications, electronics, or instruments. Japan is increasingly
dominating international markets for communication equipment, electronic
components, and instruments and is rapidly gaining market share in computers
and office equipment.
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higher-val
increase worker
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ring,
advantage by creating
process technology. It must
vely market its products.

key competi ve advantages and disadvantages in
Table 10 summa zes
high technology manufacturing. In particular, advantages in technology
in
s technology) can be imp
Human resource quality
(especial
can
improved
a greater
Federal tax and trade
policies are a current sadvantage and Cal
ia should lobby for changes
itions for these industries. The cost of capital,
to increase competi ve
ia11y the high inte
, another area that requires additional
attention primarily at
federa 1 1eve 1•

in California--

The Case

research and
its current

manu
Whi

a

bio

n

bio

to capture

gh technology in California can be complete without a
While b otechnology is still primarily in the
thus cannot be analyzed as a high
California, it is important to examine
al for the state in terms of
one hand, California 1 s current disadvantage in drug
is not v1el1 positioned to be a major
cal products created through biotechnology.
a center of
production may occur elsewhere. On
as center for the application of
culture and, because of its positive climate for
become a center
stimula ng new applications of
in, however,
question becomes
lifornia 1 a capacity
its own research.

Table 10
COMPETITIVENESS PROFILE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURI
Disadvanta!le
Major f4i nor
External
Federal policy
Changing markets
Trade policy
Internal
Product technology
Process technology

Human resources
Capital
Management

-

Pari t,l

Advantage
Minor Major

•

•
•
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cally
fied living
use
ls, or the
derived from such cells, to produce
le the ini al incentive to develop biotechnology
comme
products.
came from medical research (and specifically from research on genes
associated with cancers in some animals). biotechnology products include far
more than pharmaceuticals--special seeds that produce high-protein corn or
lize themselves by fixing nitrogen already available in
plants that can
the soil or r,
that can be used to ean up hazardous or toxic
wastes (including a
terium that breaks down spilled oil), and products
that may cut the cost of producing paper and improve the yield by converting
the lignin that binds the fibers into a less binding substance. However, it
is still the pharmaceutical aspect of the biotechnology business that offers
the greatest glamor in the near term, even though the attraction is not
nearly as strong as it was in the late 1970s and the first two years of the
B

is

as

1980s.

Everyone (investors, academics. governments) agrees that the
biotechnology indus es now emerging will eventually prove economically
rewarding. However, there are two questions that particularly affect
biotechnology in California: wi11 the state be the beneficiary of
significant new employment in biotechnology or will companies (or their
technology)
re to establish commercial production, and are there
California can take that will encourage high-value-added production to
rather than elsewhere?
thin
s
take ace

Industry Structure and Economics

le 11 lists
biotechnology companies in California that already
have revenues from the sale of biotechnology products. Table 12 lists the
1i
a bi
ogy companies that are still developing products and
to expand into commercial production at some point.
I
on, Cali
a
53 other biotechnology companies that have
neither sales nor empl
and are likely to consist primarily of a single
aca
c researc

Table 11
CALIFORNIA BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANI
Name
Amgen
Applied Biosystems, Inc.
Bio-Rad Laboratories
Breit laboratories, Inc.
Cetus Corporation
Cooper laboratories
DDI Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Diagnostic Products Corporation
Hybri tech, Inc.
In tell i genetics
Molecular Biosystems, Inc.
Monoclonal Antibodies
NI~S Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Synbiotics Corporation
Syncor International Corporation
Tago, Inc.
Technic1one International, ltd.
Urlta Systems, Inc.
Viratek, Inc.
Zymed Laboratories
Chevron*
Crown Zellerbach*
Syntex Corporation*

PRODUCT SALES

City
Thousand Oaks
Foster City
Richmond
West Sacramento
Emeryville
Palo Alto
f~ountain View
Los Angeles
San Diego
Palo Alto
San Diego
Mountain View
Newport Beach
San Marcos
Sylmar
Burlingame
Santa Ana
Irvine
Covina
South San Francisco
San Francisco
San Francisco
Palo Alto

*Divisions of these companies are engaged in biotechnology.
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Ownership
Publ i ely owned
Publicly owned
Publicly owned
Publicly owned
Publicly owned
Pub 1 i ely owned
Pub 1i c1y owned
Publicly owned
Publ ic1y owned
Subsidiary
Pub 1i c ly O\'lned
Pub1 icly owned
Pub 1i c ly owned
Publicly owned
Publicly owned
Publicly owned
Publicly owned
Publ i ely owned
Subsidiary

vately owned
Publicly owned
Publ ic1y owned
Publicly owned

le 1

CALI

IA BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANIES WI

EMPLOYEES BUT WITHOUT SALES
Owners11i p

Advanced Genetic Sciences, Inc.
pha Therapeutic
· on
Antibodies, Inc.
Arco
1
I
tute
Bio-Response,
Ca 1gene, Inc.
California Biotechnology, Inc.
Chiron Corporation
Collagen Corporation
Creative Biomolecules. Inc
Engenics, Inc.
tech, Inc.
INGENE I
Engineering. Inc.)
International Plant Research
Institute, Inc.
li posome Technol
Microgenics
on
• Inc.

Francisco

Publicly owned
Subsidiary
Privately owned
Subsidiary
Publicly owned
Privately owned
Publicly owned
Publicly owned
Publicly owned
Privately owned
Privately owned
Publicly owned

ca

Privately owned

isco

Subsidiary
Privately owned
?rivately owned
Privately owned
Privately owned
Privately owned
Privately owned
Privately owned
Privately owned

es
Dublin
Hayward
Davis
Mountain View
Emeryville
Palo Alto
South
Francisco
0

South
i~oni

San

rl os

o Park

Concord
San Diego
ia

es Corpora on

bi
en

0

a
un
tota 1 techni
ons cost.
pharmaceuti
products are very
labor required for development.
Scale-up for quantity production,

the product, stabilization of the
from $5 million to $10 million per
pharmaceuticals can range from $20 llion
each new product. It is estimated that at
biotechnology pharmaceuticals 11
Requirements for testing of products
exacting, although it is necessary
will not be toxic to consumers
biotechnology products (e.g., a bacterium
are held up in some cases by environmental
environmental
statement, for
under the purview
EPA)
governs use and testing}.
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Genentech was started in 1976 by a
capitalist and a Stanford
professor and when i went public in 980
stock offering raised
$203 million. However. the company moved quickly to license its early
produc to big
ies
already had mark
ng and production
capabilities. such as
i Lilly & Co. Since then, Genentech has
begun to build its own
and marketing organization. Other
corporations have sought out corporate investors as the venture capital
market has lost enthusiasm for biotechnology. Firms using R&D limited
partnerships, in whi
i
is primarily made by those looking for
tax shelters rather
ate returns, have increased.

on has i
significantly since the early
Investor sophis
1980s ·
al investors now demand not just a wonderful product but a
large
and sound business acumen. Areas such as plant
are attracting more capital than human medicine.
ci
genetics and

industries, and because production
, it makes little sense to discuss the
usua 1 way. It makes more sense to discuss
biotechnology. California now has
tion lies
the bi
ogy industry in the country.
ia universi
tern are substantially
ishments. However, within the United States,
ina are inves ng in measures aimed at
of
industry in their states.
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tts
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some biotechnology activity, has
oped highly vocal opposition to research and production based on
recombinant DNA
may not be a se ous competitor for industry expansion
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biotechnology firms,
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biotechnology firms have the
1
ir
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own production and distribution
system, this is
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few future firms. The
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ts require neither large
scale production nor tradi
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bution systems. Specialized products
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, such as instrumentation
and in
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s
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PhDs in chemical engineering. The
s
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re are a
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n
firm (i.e .• UpJohn and Dow, for
example).
as investors in "
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While California
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and international markets.

increase
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ogy. These
and commercial applications of emerging
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resources
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tural markets could
use of bi
what are
These strategies involve usi
value-added products
elsewhere. This might mean
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on)
versi ty resources)
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state's
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1arge

candidate for the
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ies.
te new, high
e
to create

chemical feed stocks
cultural and forestry wastes. generating high
value minerals and chemicals from mining tailings, and using biotechnology to
address hazardous waste (which lower industry costs and undesirable
consequences of production).
California's universities are working on such applications (U.C. Davis,
for example). but are still far from direct commercial application. In fact,
an underlying problem in mobilizing the potential of biotechnology in
California is the reluctance of the University system to more aggressively
pursue technology commercialization within the system, and in conjunction with
industry.
In addition, while California's current industries may not i>e investing

in the large-scale application of biotechnology, there are opportunities for

joint-ventures with overseas rms. The joint venture between ~ngen of
Thousand Oaks, California, and Kirin Breweries of Japan is one current example
of this strategy. In the long run, biotechnologies can be expected to play a
role in virtually every large scale chemical production process--and a good
many nonindustrial applications, such as drain cleaners--in addition to the
more visible medical and agricultural applications.
aspects in which California may find itself at a competitive
sadvantage include housing costs (biotechnology production workers are
expected to be id on a level similar to that of biology lab technicians
rather than a level similar to that of computer designers or chip process
engineers). the time it takes to get permits, and perhaps environmental
politics.
Although environmental and health regulation have been raised as issues
that mi
impede the development of the biotechnology industry--and they
certainly do at the federal level--the impact of state laws, present and
future is not yet clear. At the present time, the state regulatory climate
appears
ous but supportive. Industry fears that regulations may impede
commercializa on have not yet been realized, and the California state
government appears, at a minimum, inclined to help make any regulatory
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sector seem oriented towards a more
anal regu1
system.
Nevertheless, there need only be one incident of note to precip tate a more
industry.
stringent state role in overseeing this emergi
In the final analysis, the prospects for bi
ogy to become a
or
economic asset for California 11 stem more from the ability of this ghly
ons than
science-based indus try to identify and rea 1 i ze commercia 1 app 1 i
from any incentives that the state could provi

and maintaining
The state will need to continue to invest in c
to i
ove
production of skilled professionals in biotechnology. It will
university capacity to explore the commerci
applications
science--particularly focusing on "technology capture..
ies that will
pay off in Cali
a. And it 11 need to
p to keep business costs for
(i.e.,
ing,
this industry within reason, relative to competi
taxes, and environmental regulation).
s success in California
For the most part, the otechnology indus
the industry itself.
present
11 depend on the gradual maturation
time. the hi
on of
rms in Cali
ia looks good,
industry is struggling with difficulties in identifying and p
ing
commercia1izable products. It is also wrestling with management that has a
on scale-up
ence bias and lacks business direction, has not
technology problems (in many instances}, and
lost its favored child status
th the venture capital industry.
idly being acquired by out of state
Today otechno1
rms are
owners, whose corporate cultures sometimes ash, and technology is being
rected to o~t-of-state labs and plants. They are licensing the production
distribution to out-of-state companies, which diminishes return to the
loc
firm. Firms struggling to remain free
larger buyers are merging to
combine research and development strengths with production seale-up

capabilities.

nally

some of

ving firms are discovering. much to

their disappointment,

"magic bullets" of biotechnology have indeterminate

markets that may

years to cultivate.

This industry is not analogous to the now more mature computer and
semiconductor industries. Biotechnology straddles both old and new markets,
with the potential for dramatic transformation of each. The promises of this
technology will eventually be realized,
th economic benefits being
distributed far more broadly than in the case of the Silicon Valley.
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V BASIC MANUFACTURINu IN CALIFORNIA

Introduction
Basic manufacturing--consisting of all manufacturing outside of
aerospace and high technology manufacturing--may be considered a "hidden
sector .. in the California economy. Most analyses and forecasts of the
state•s economy tend to focus on more glamorous industries such as aerospace,
high tech, and financial services or on such obvious California strengths as
agriculture. The analysis anJ projections of the Center for Continuing Study
of the California Economy are the only major, continuing analyses and
projections that break out the basic manufacturing sector. It is often
assumed that, because of the highly visible declines in such basic
manufacturing sectors as autos and steel, basic manufacturing as a whole is
n severe decline and of little importance to the state. This is hardly the
case.
After government, the leading producer of jobs in the state is not
agriculture, not high tech, not aerospace, not finance. It is basic
manufacturing. There are two important introductory points to make
concerning this sector. First, as Table 13 illustrates, it is still a very
large sector of the economy and likely to remain so in the foreseeable
future. although it will become steadily less important over time. In 1981,
for example, 66.5% of all manufacturing jobs in the state were in the basic
manufacturing sector, while aerospace and high tech accounted for 10.3% and
.2% of manufacturing jobs, respectively.
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e 13

ANALYSIS OF BAS

MANUFACTURI
(Thousands)

Jobs
Basic Manu- All r~am1facturing
facturin9

Basic Manufacturi ng Jobs
as a Percent
of all Jobs

Basic as
a Percent
of all
Manufacturing

1972

1,104.8

1,536.0

72.0%

8,208.5

13.5%

1981

1,342.8

2,018.8

66.5%

11 ,298. 0

11.9%

1991

1,558.8

2,532.8

63.0%

13,900.0

11.4%

Source:

California Growth in the 1980s:
Study of the California Economy,

1983. Center

Continuing

*****
Second, as Table 14 illustrates, it
Unlike a state like Michigan where autos
steel
is so strong. California s manufacturing
not contain any single
industry that is an overall national leader. Thus, \'fhile autos and steel are
in decline, other key industries such as printing and publishing
apparel
are growing. But, perhaps because in no one of these industries is
California visible as a national leader as it is in aerospace
gh
tech). the sector as a whole does not get as much attention and is not as
1 understood as other sectors.
1

Given its conti
importance to
overall state economy, however,
parti
ar1y in light of the strengths of certain basic manufacturing
industries, it is important for the state to devel
a better understanding
of this part of i
economy. Because of
verse nature and
ative lack

Table 14

TYPES OF BASIC MANUFACTURING IN CALIFORNIA

Employees
(Number)
1977
1982
Food
Apparel
Lumber
Furniture
Paper
Printing and publishing
Chemicals
Petroleum
Rubber
Stone and glass
Metals
Fabricated metals
hinerya
Transportation equipmentb
see 11 aneous

a
b

163.4
101 • 1

67.1
51.9
35.9
97.1
52.7
18.5
63.6
53.0
49.0
136.2
110.9
92.9
40.0

173.5
106.3
48.4
52.6
35.5
131 • 1
52.6
18.8
66.1
49.0
42.4
139.9
135.2
60.9
38.3

Excluding office and computing machines (high tech)
Excluding aircraft and missiles (aerospace)
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Value Added
{$000,000)
1977
1982
6,578
1 '770
1 ,840
1,065
1 ,310
2,877
2,803
2,540
1 •618
1 ,828
1,349
4,012
3,327
2,806
1,070

10,936
2,505
1,445
1 '71 0
1, 978
5,473
4,058
4,155
2,398
2,283
1. 718
5,736
6,195
2,944
1 ,667

rel
study

on on
s
and
a lesser
n
11
s

The

be made in

i

es--au
ch
s sec on.

s

some

on are:

rnia S large and verse basic manufacturing sector is strongest
in those industries that have
creative, exploited advanced
technologies, developed special market ches (either for export or
for import substitution), and grouped themselves in economic clusters.
i

1

California s manufacturing industries are affected
same
internal and external forces (e.g., foreign trade,
on of new
technologies) that affect other U.S. manufacturers.
forces
opportunities in
present California industries th
threats
the future.
1

Dealing th the threats and
will require continued effo
creativity and innovation,
agglomerations.

Background

and

History

It is useful to think about basic
The
rubber.

ities
technologi
advancement,
, and local economic

n

categories:

tional "smokestack" industries, such as autos, steel, and

versified manufacturing. includi
metal products, and other i
es.

printing.

iances,

the smokestack i
es were es
i
i
ia during
mmediately after World War II. The steei i
, for
e, built
the fully integrated Fontana steel mi 1 to meet wartime needs. General
Motors and Ford built major assembly plants (GM in Fremon
South
• and
l~uys, and Ford in Pico Rivera and Nilpitas) in the state during the
1950s and
The re industry devel
same time
(Firestone in South Gate
Salinas and Goodyear in Los
es).
Historically,
ifornia has also had strong l
processi
industries.
Most of

In general,
tal-intensive
estack industries have declined
ifornia n recent years.
is is where most of the plant
severely in
closings and job losses have occurred. Those firms that survive have
generally adopted some kind of niche strategy (e.g., using new technologies
such as minimills to serve local steel markets and using new production
processes in the NUMr4I plant in Fremont to produce small cars).
The diversifi
manufacturing industries have grown in the state
primarily as a result of a process of "import substitution," whereby a wide
variety of industries shift some production facilities to California as
older facilities become unproductive and new location decisions are made.
Import substitution occurs when goods produced within the state replace
goods brought in from other states or other countries. It is understandable
given the magnitude of the
ifornia market that this would happen.
With some exceptions, most of the diversified manufacturing is for the
California market rather than for export. And, except for a few special
cases such as motion pictures, no industry in the diversified manufacturing
sector can be consi red a national leader. Most of the basic manufacturing
in
state (about two-thirds) takes place in or near the Los Angeles Basin.
manufacturing sectors in the state, unlike the
smokestack indus es are generally heal thy and may expect moderate growth
in the future. Such growth is predicated on the fact that California is one
of
nation's fastest growing 111arkets for all kinds of manufactured goods
and yet it
ill has a substantially below-average share of jobs in most
indus es in
basic manufacturing sector.

Current Status
verse na
of the ba c manufacturing sector makes it difficult
to generalize about the sector as a whole. Therefore, three different
industries within the sector will be examined (autos, steel, and apparel)
and printing will be examined to a lesser degree. These industries are
profil
in Table 15.
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Table 1 5
PROFILES OF BASIC MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN CALIFORNIA

1963

1967

1972

418

397

527

1982

Autos
Number of Establishments
Employment (OOOs)

27.0

Employ. Share
Value Added ($1,000)
Constant 1972 Dollars

3.9~

33.2
4.5~

39.4

718

48.6

624
28.8

4.9%

5.5%

4.7'1,

583,424
814,042

639,100
808,373

1,121,100
1.121 • 100

1,977.600
1.412,067

1,500,800
723,696

Prod. hrs. {OOOs)

48,403

52,400

64,500

80,000

42.600

v. A./Prod.

12.4
16.8

12.2
15.4

17.4

24.7
17.7

17.0

19'l.

9%

9%

2%

-9%

3,991.800
3,991,800

7.352,200
5,249,697

4,691,600
2,262,320

6.21

4.2%

hr.
Constant 1972 Dollar

Cal. Prod. Advantage
over U.S. (1972 $)

v of

na
na

2,344,600
2,965,596

't of U.S. Shpmts.

na

5.81.

Shpmts. ($1,000)
Constant 1972 Dollars

17.4

6.2%

35.2

Steel
Number of Establishments

69

84

80

Employment (OOOs)

19.5

22.4

19.6

115
17.8

93
11.8

3.4%

3.6'1,

3.5%

3.4~

3.2%

267.447
373,165

378,800
479,130

342,000
342.000

512,600
366,012

641,000
309,094

Prod. hrs. (OOOs)

30,104

35,000

27,800

26,200

16,500

V.A./Prod. hr.
Constant 1972 Dollar

8.9
12.4

13.7

Employ. Share
Value Added ($1,000)
Constant 1972 Dollars

10.8

2.3
12.3

19.6
4.0

38.8
18.7

1963

1967

1972

1977

1982

-7'1,

4%

-11%

-14'1,

24%

Steel

Cal. Prod. Advantage
over U.S. (1972 $)
V of Shpmts. ($1 ,000)
Constant 1972 Dollars

na
na

907,600
1,147,989

'.t of U.S. Shpmts.

na

3.9'Z.

78

964,500
991,500
3.4'1,

1,741,300
1,243,342

1,833,200
883,981

3.41.

3.9'1.

Table 15 (Concluded)

AeEarel

Number of Establishments
Employment (OOOs)

1108
31.6
7.8~

Employ. Share
Value Added ($1 ,000)
Constant 1972 Dollars
Prod. hrs. (OOOs)

2656

274b

33.1

40.9

58.6

63.0

13. l'.l;

15.01.

8.1%

9.5~

214,229
298,910

290,200
367,063

462,700
462,700

1 ,022.700
730,239

1,573,200
758,607

48,436

50,200

62,000

86,600

92,000

4.4
6.2

5.8
7.3

V.A./Prod. hr.
Constant 1972 Dollar
Cal. Prod. Advantage
over U.S. (1972 $)

1441

139

131.

7.5
7.5
201.

1St

V of Shpmts. ( $1 ,000)
Constant 1972 Dollars

na

na

635,000
803,187

971,000
971 ,000

t of U.S. Shpmts.

na

9.7;

11. 7t

17.1
8.2

11.8
8.4
21%
2,104,600
1,502,749
16. 51.

28~

3,317,600
1,599,769
18.21.

Printing and Publishing
Number of Establishments
Employment (OOOs)

3671
74.4

Employ. Share

3660
82.7

4535
88.0

5905
97.1

131.1

8.0%

8.3%

846,820
1,181,554

1 ,167,200
1,476,347

1,706,900
1,706,900

2,876,700
2,054,052

5,473,200
2,639,213

Prod. hrs.

85,810

90,500

93,000

100,800

129,200

V.A./Prod. hr.
Constant 1972 Dollar

9.9
13.8

28.5
20.4

42.4
20.4

Value Added ($1 ,000
Constant 1972 Dol ars

8.1'%

2.0%

V of
( $1 ,000)
Constant 1972 Dollars

na

% of U.S.

na

Source:

na

12.9
16.3
7.5%
l. 713,500
2,167,341
7.9%

Census of Manufactures

79

18.4
18.4
7.3%
2,541,800
2,541,800
8.4%

8.9%

6556

2.91.
4,463,100
3,186. 790
9.0%

10.1%

2.1%
8,592,100
4,143,167
lO.Ot

one

int California was
among
in automobile
t.
ly in
au
ile
on
i
state in
s is a result both of the economic difficul es of
past 5 years.
U.S. auto firms and the decision by the g
reconcentrate their
faci ities in the i4idwest. Employment in automobile production in
California dropped
a hi
55,000 in 1978 to 28,000 in 1982.
Shipments dropped from $8.5 billion to $4.7 billion over the same period.
Most of the major production plants have closed:
closed plants at Pico
Rivera (1980,1aying off 2,300 workers} and Milpitas (1983, laying off
4,900), GM closed plants in Fremont (1982. laying off 5,860) and South Gate
(1982, laying off 4,700), and the f4ack Truck ant closed {1981, laying off
1,400). Not surprisingly, the tire industry that supplied the auto industry
closed plants about the same time. Firestone osed plants in South Gate
(1980, laying off 1,400) and Salinas (1981, laying off 1,700) and Goodyear
closed its plant in Los Angeles (1980. laying off 1,600).
Today, tire production has ceased completely and only two auto
production plants remain open in California. One is the the GM plant in Van
Nuys. The other is the NUMNI plant in Fremont,
new GtVToyota joint
venture to produce small cars in America using advanced technologies and new
production processes. At the same time, almost all Japanese firms have
established their :~orth American corporate headquarters in the Los Angeles
area and some Japanese firms build parts and do some final assembly in
California (e.g .• Nissan assembles trucks in long Beach). Finally, it is
interesting to note that an the major U.S. auto firms and some Japanese
rms have established auto design studios in Southern California. This
appears to reflect two factors: proximity to a 1eadi ng school of auto
design in Pomona and a desire to keep in touch th the style trends in what
is perceived to be a trend-setting state.
Steel production has also declined severely in California. From 1978
to 1982, employment dropped from 18,000 to 12,000 and shipments dropped from
$2.0 billion to $1.8 billion. US Steel, Bethlehem Steel, and Kaiser Steel
closed down a11 the integrated steel plants in California between 1978 and
1983. Foreign steel now dominates the market. What remains are the

mi mills, whi
use new
o
rent manpower arrangements to
produce specialty
to
state's construction and industry
needs, and steel
and
ce centers that act as middlemen
between manufacturers (and foreign
iers) and steel users in
California. The firms that have su
the industry shakeout appear to be
doing well. A new firm, California Steel, has purchased the Kaiser plant in
Fontana with partners from Japan (who provided the capital) and Brazil (who
provide low-cost
slab).
In contrast to the smokestack industries (autos and steel), the
California apparel industry has grown steadily. It is the second largest
employer in the manufacturing sector. Between 1963 and 1982, employment
doubled from 31,000 to 63,000, and shipments rose from $635 million to
$3.3 billion.
is concentrated n downtown Los Angeles (and to
a lesser extent. in San Franclsco) in a fairly concentrated industrial
district
ogous to New York's historic 7th Avenue garment district).
There is an extensive network of small design firms, job shops, sewing
contractors
• most
which are independent. The industry has grown
up around a cadre of crea ve and well known California designers. It makes
use of
most
technologies in the industry (e.g., automated
cutters, software for
rn-making)
employs mostly low-skilled, very
ow id
on wo
• many of whom are recent immigrants.
lifornia's

try has succeeded by focusing on the
high
gh-va ue-added end of the market--both formal and casual 1vear,
ce.
arly
children. This segment of the market is very
rti
women
ve, consta y
(four to s x seasons per year),
consumer-responsive,
o
a
small production runs. Thus,
un1 ike market
such as men's shirts or underwear which are much more
table, less desi
ious, and more suitable to mass production, the
tion for California industry require the creativity of
network of worki
relationships in the Los Angeles
district, as
1 as
imi
to the American consumer, particularly the
s
ous and
California consumer.

California's printi
and publi
industry
also been growing.
in 1982. Like apparel, it
rose
97.
in 1
has employed new
es,
industry agglomerations, and
succeeded in selected and highly creative market niches. Most of the major
trade publishing houses continue to be based in New York. However, there
t1as been an exp1 os ion of sma 11 and speci a1ty pub 1i shi ng houses .in
California. There are now about 500 publishing houses in the state. They
are concentrated in communities such as Berkeley (50-plus firms) and Santa
Barbara (more than 100 firms). They focus on such specialty topics as
bicycling, computers, vegetarian cooking, and solar energy. There are also
important academic and textbook publishers such as the University of
California Press, Stanford Press, Silver Burdette, and Addison-Wesley. t4ost
make active use of new technologies such as computerization. And, while the
sales of the major publishing houses have been stagnant in recent years, the
smaller houses have seen steadY growth.
Analysis of Internal and External Factors
California's basic manufacturing sector is affected by the same set of
external and internal factors that affect other U.S. manufacturers. The
external factors include trade, the business cycle, federal policy, and
changing consumer tastes. The factors internal to firms include use of
technology, human resources, financial capital, and management.
What remains of the auto industry in California is quite fferent from
that in the f>1idwest in that it is more dependent on imports and relations
with foreign producers, and has developed special niches within the
industry. Almost half the cars purchased in Cali
ia today are imports.
In light of this fact and given the state•s proximity to the Pacific Basin
with its Japanese exports, the strength of the imports favors California.
Japanese firms have established a variety of facilities here, and with
pressure for more foreign production in the United States could expand
further. NUt+II. for example, has announced plans to begin producing Toyotas
as well as the Novas being produced with GM. The state has become the
design center of the auto industry because of its role in setting trends and
styles for the country.
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Tech ogy is cl
a re c
factor in both the auto
product and the production process. GM's purchase of California-based
Hughes is intended to
p GM bri
new technology to the manufacturing
process and could result in new technology links for the state to the auto
industry. The Japanese involvement in the NUMMI plant may suggest the
opportunity for more joint ventures with foreign firms in the state. Issues
such as productivity, quality, and labor/management relations are seen as
key issues for the industry, and NUMMI is seen as a potential model for new
practices in these areas.
Steel is another industry heavily affected by external forces (imports)
with foreign firms having developed a strong position in imported steel
slab. California minimills use scrap steel and other firms process low-cost
imported steel to meet the particular steel needs of California. Since
California has no integrated
mills, it is not as interested as other
parts of the United States in imposing strict import quotas on slab steel.
Tl1e market for stee 1 in the state is radi ca 11y different from that in the
t. Here, the construe on industry uses over half of the steel produced
in California wi
cans for the food processing industry being the second
"'
largest user. In other parts of the country, the automotive and machinery
industries use most
the steel produced. California's announced plans to
renovate i
s, bridges, and other infrastructure could mean a boom
for the state's steel makers.
The California
rms that have best survived the recent shakeout in the
steel industry have
that adopted new work rules and styles of
;nanagement, and
more modern technology to both products and
i
produc on
revived California steel plant, as in autos,
s.
joint rei
investment was particularly important.
California apparel industry differs from the rest of the U.S.
tex le
ch has been in severe decline and is actively seeking
addi onal import res
c ons. By focusing on the design-oriented end of
the apparel market, California firms have found a niche that seems less
vulnerable to
tion from abroad.

Within the industry, the rms have attracted top designers and made
use
mmigrants as low-cost labor.
rms have tended to form
omerations in the los Angeles and San Francisco areas; these
agglomerations have proven essential to keep up with the fast-moving apparel
market California sells to. The firms have also made good use of the latest
technologies, such as those being de vel oped by the new industry-sponsored
Tailoring and Clothing Technology Corporation.
Similarly, the printing and publishing industry has developed its
special market niches, as described above. International competition and
federal policy do not appear to be major concerns for this industry. But,
again, as with apparel, printing is an industry that has relied on creative
people, new production technologies, and agglomerations in both southern and
northern California.

Competitive Assessment
In autos, California is at a sig~ificant disadvantage in that the major
U.S. firms have decided to reconcentrate their plants in the Midwest.
Productivity in the state has not improved in recent years and the state•s
share of U.S. shipments has declined dramatically. There appears to be
little possibility that major U.S. producers will move back to the state in
the foreseeable future.
On the other hand, there is at least the possibility (given the
positive experience to date at NUMt~I) that Japanese or other Asian firms may
build additional plants in California either by themselves or in joint
ventures with U.S. firms. Toyota, for example, has announced plans to build
a ti!ajor U.S. plant. which could be located in the state. However, most
industry analysts expect future plants to be located in the center of the
country, in lower cost areas such as Arkansas, Tennessee, and Texas.
Another area of potential growth centers on the GM purchase of Hughes, which
could provide the state's industries with a stronger link into the
development of new technology for future cars and future auto manufacturing
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processes.
s could i d on the 1i s that some il icon Valley firms
already have th the i
try,
though, again, California firms would seem
to be at a disadvantage compared to
new high-tech firms emerging in Ann
Arbor's "Automation Alley." However the NUMf"'I plant could already be
providing a successful model of advanced manufacturing. If so, then auto
manufacturers might see some benefit in establishing a plant closer to design
sources and to those experienced in advanced manufactuing.
The outlook
steel is similar to that for autos in many v1ays. The
industry's producti ty rates and share of U.S. shipments have been
relatively stable in recent years. There is no hope that large integrated
mills will be built again in California or anywhere in the United States
because of their extreme cost and competition from foreign producers. High
transportation costs from the East mean that California firms have the best
opportunity
meet the state's needs for steel. Because of the 1imited
domestic competition on the West Coast, there may be an opportunity for
innovative minimills and for steel processors and service centers in
California to expand
ir markets. More joint ventures with foreign firms
that produce ab more cheaply than U.S. firms may be in the offing (similar
to the Kawasaki/Cali
ia Steel venture).
Although much
the apparel industry has been subjected to foreign
on in the U.S. the California apparel industry has successfully
carved out a niche in the high fashion area and appears to have an edge on
both foreign and domestic competitors. Whi 1e its productivity rates have
fairly
le. i
share of U.S. shipments has approximately doubled
over
past 15
• grm11ing from 9.
to 18.2% of the U.S. market.
The
industry
pa
cu1ar1y aggressive in adopting new manufacturing
ogies. Thus.
ture prospects for the industry look relatively bright.

in
been

u.s.

Similarly,
prin ng and publishing industry has carved out its niche
speci
i i ng areas. While its productivity rates also have
u.s. shipments has risen from 9.0% to 10.0% of the
stable, its
market. Its future also looks bright.
A

itative assessment

the four industries is shown in Tables 16-19.
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Table 6
CALIFORNIA AUTO INDUSTRY VS.
Pari tl

Oisadvanta~e

Major

I~IDvJEST

Advanta2e
Minor

Minor

r~ajor

Federal Policy
Changing Markets
Trade Po 1 icy
Technology
Human Resources

-

-

Capital
Management

-

Table ,7
CALIFORNIA STEEL INDUSTRY VS. THE EAST
Disadvantage
Major
Federal Policy
Changing 14irkets
Trade Policy
Technology
Human Resources
Capita 1
Management
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!~inor
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de Policy
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Human Resources
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Major
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Table 19
I

IA PRINTING INDUSTRY VS. NEW YORK

Parity
nor

---

Poli

Human Resources

ital
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-
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Future Prospects--Basic Manufacturing
i1e making projections of any sector in the economy is ways risky,
projections of the basic manufacturing sector are particularly difficult
because of the diverse nature of the sector. However, certain
generalizations can be made.
Overall, projections by the Center for the Continuing Study of
California suggest that the sector will continue to grow and add a
substantial number of jobs in the future, although this growth will be at a
slower rate than that of the high tech and aerospace sectors. As
Table 113indicates, the sector is expected to grow from 1.34 million to
1.56 million jobs from 1981 to 1991. However, since this growth will be
slower than the other manufacturing sectors, basic manufacturing's share of
all manufacturing jobs will drop from 66.5% to 63.0% and its share of all
jobs in the state will drop from 11.9% to 11.4%. However, it is interesting
to note that the Center's projections indicate that the state's share of
basic manufactruing jobs in the country will increase from 7.7 to 8.3% during
the period of 1981-1991.
of the projected growth will be as a result of the process of
import substitution, with the state expected to gain an increasing share of
national jobs in a wide range of manufacturing industries. This seems likely
because the state currently has a below average share of jobs in many basic
manufacturing sector industries, in spite of the fact that it is one of the
na on's fastest growing market areas for manufactured goods. Thus, whatever
growth occurs in these industries nationally, California is likely to capture
an ever-increasing share.
r~1ost

There seems to be little reason to believe that the 11 Smokestack 11
industries such as auto and steel will ever return to their previous levels
of activity and employemnt in the state as a result of such factors as
international trade and the recentralization of the auto industry in the
f4idwest.
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es--parti
have established niches or those
tech and aerospace industries such
as machinery--waul d
average growth rates than the sector as a
whole. While it is impossible to
ct, other industries in the sector that
(e.g., creativity, growing markets} may emerge
ay on the sta 's
or who 1e new industries may emerge such as the
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Implications
ic manufacturing industries important to

The ana1ysi s
California--autos, s
factors
out.
successful

, and printing--shows certain common success
a's basic manufacturing industries are most

ve talent in the state.

market niches (whether for export or for import
ng
n

ns

to

technologies.

economic clusters.

en to support the further development of
ri
industries should generally encourage the
factors. Such steps could include:

,
-;wr.:;;.;;,;_;;..._,;-,....:.:::.._.;;;.;.;_:.................;..:...;_.:::..;;._.;;_;..:_

not just to develop technical skills
engi
ng, but also to develop
through support for programs such as the

opment and application of new manufacturin~
keep California firms at the cutting edge.
manufacturing in the LA area might be
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Promoting the further development and expansion of regional economic
clusters by supporting producer-supplier relationships in key
industries.
Development of export markets to facilitate the expansion of firms
that originally developed to serve the California market and now are
ready for expansion.
Development of additional markets through import substitution,
particularly in those industrial sectors where California's share of
jobs is below average.
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THE

INDUSTRY IN CALIFORNIA

Introduction
indus
is
prime example of the role
a's
that technology
on have played in shaping the state's economic
i
development. Aerospace is one of the state's largest industries. For the
past 50 years, the industry has ranked as one of California's largest
employers.
• expertise in the scientific fields related to
aerospace
ped to
rk the growth of the ectronics industry in Silicon
Valley.
li

The California aerospace industry- ike high technology manufacturing-role that regional agglomerations can play in the
also illus tes
growth of an
Over
past 50 years, aircraft production has been
transfo
more versi ed aerospace industry; however, much of
in its original location in Los Angeles,
n
es. This region had an early comparative
on and manufacture of aircraft. Some histories
a
ces to locate aircraft production there in part to a
imate (little rain) and the region's
exi
and
ne industries. The presence of
e
companies meant that both capital and a ~mrk
rce i
were available in the area, and the Southern
1i
ted to the tes ng and assembly of aircraft.

1i

ae
success was

as Stan
and continue
th
ineers

most important factor in
universities and research centers
Cal Tech. These institutions were
in that they supplied the growing industry
a source of basic research that was

later applied to aerospace production. This expertise was not limited to
research and skill in the aircraft industry; because of the complexity of
the component systems of the industry's product, innovations in related
techno 1ogi es--such as meta 11 urgy, fue 1s, and electric components --have been
key to the industry's growth. For example, without breakthroughs in
metallurgy, the development of the jet engine--perhaps the most important
technological breakthrough in the commercial aircraft industry--would not
have taken place. As the industry grew, it served to attract other national
research centers, such as the NASA Ames, Lawrence Livermore, and Lawrence
Berkeley laboratories.
It is also important to recognize the extraordinary influence that the
Federal Government has played in the development of the aerospace industry.
The U.S. government has always taken an active role in steering the course
of the industry's development, starting in the 1920s with its air mail
contracts and continuing through its role as a provider of research and
development funding (in the areas of military aircraft, and later space
technology) and as the major purchaser of the industry's products. However,
although the Federal Goverment has played a decisive role in terms of being
both a large source of demand and an actual funder of innovation within the
industry. its decisions were probably not instrumental in affecting the
heavy concentration of production in California. In fact, during World
War II, the Federal Government made conscious decisions to locate new
capacity outside of California and other vulnerable coastal regions. After
World War II, as the industry consolidated, there was a definite shift back
to the initial location pattern, in which a high percentage of firms were
located in the coastal areas, especially California.
Because the Federal Government is the major purchaser of California's
aerospace products, federal policy decisions will have a major effect on the
overall level of industry activity within the state. However, California's
future competitiveness within the industry will be determined by factors
over which the state can have some control.
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li
a 1 s ae
s
is currently
ding high as a result of
the combined e
ts of increases in military spending, the program to
develop the space s tion, and the early stages of President Reagan 1 S
Strategic Defense Ini ative (SDI).
re 6, which illustrates California
aerospace * employment between 1972 and 1985, shows that state employment
, guided missiles, and space vehicles totaled
in the production of ai
226,400 as of July 1
highest level since the post-Vietnam slowdown
in defense spendi
though the above data do not distinguish between
1:1ilitary and commercial production, recent industry trends indicate that
California 1 S aircraft production is increasingly concentrated in military
planes. Furthermore. recent increases in spending on missiles and space
vehicles will likely
composition of production in California; in
captured 50% of U.S. value added and 40% of
the past decade, the state
government defense contracts in this industry.
However, several factors are affecting and will continue to influence
the state 1 s competi veness within the aerospace industry. The current
outlook
r
ia's aerospace industry is for relatively flat
oyment over
near term. Industry experts predict that the DoD budget
will remain
a constant level (in 1984 dollars) through 199S; spending on
ssi es, airc
, and helicopters will decline slightly, while space
ng should ncrease. However, it is also important to note that the
overall level of de se funding is vulnerable to changes in political
to be highly volatile (perhaps even more so than the
es). Although the prospects for a large reduction in
ar business

*

is
unless otherwise noted, the aerospace industry is
ned
to the U.S. Bureau of the Census definition, to
372 (aircraft) and 376 (guided missiles and space
include SIC
vehicles).
1ifornia Employment Development Department definition
includes
gh technology industries; these were not included in
this analysis to avoid overlap with the high technology industry.
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re is evidence that concentration on military production
inhibits the process of innovation and commercial product development that
can keep California firms competitive in private sector markets. This
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turing industries.

The

aerospace industry includes military and civil aircraft, engines and
subassemblies, space vehicles, and the systems parts and components
incorporated into these final transports. It is characterized by
high-value-added, low-volume products; the planes and missiles produced are
expensive but sold in relatively small quantities. These products are
highly complex, integrating a number of highly sophisticated technologies.
The complexity of these systems means that products are expensive to develop
and difficult to test; this leads to a higher than usual degree of risk
because it increases the likelihoo4 that products will be unsuccessful.
Industry structure, particularly for aircraft production, is also
distinctive. Most aerospace work is concentrated among a few, very large
(but diversified) firms. These firms are also highly interdependent.
Usually, several firms will be involved in producing a single system, with
the prime contractor subcontracting pieces of the work to other fi nns within
the industry. Subcontracting emerged as a means of spreading the risk
involved in aircraft production and has become more prevalent as firms try
to cope with an increasingly competitive environment. In the future,
subcontracts are increasingly 1ikely to include foreign as well as domestic
firms.
Finally, competitiveness is increasingly becoming important to the
aerospace industry. The industry depends heavily on export markets to
absorb its productive capacity. Although national defense needs will always
guarantee some level of demand for domestic production capacity, the main
industry strength in the past few decades has been in exports. Aerospace
products--both civil and military--have been the largest source of U.S.
export sales in recent years. 1982 aerospace exports totalled $15.6
billion, with an industry trade balance of $11 billion. In the years
between 1977 and 1982, 75% of total aerospace exports were in civilian
aircraft. It has become impossible for commercial aircraft firms to be
profitable--let alone competitive--if they cannot continue to capture a
significant share of foreign demand. Table 20 summarizes the forces
currently affecting California's aerospace industry.
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us contracting and increasea
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External Factors
The business cycle has played an important role in California's
increasing concentration in military production. Sales of commercial
aircraft are directly affected by business cycles; the recessions and oil
shocks of the mid 1970s and early 1980s were particularly bad times for
commercial aircraft producers. During that same time Lockheed's near
failure due to poor sales of the L-1011 (which was in part a result of these
recessions) also contributed to an increasing degree of risk aversion within
the industry. Because defense contracts rely on appropriated funding,
military contracting is somewhat insulated from cyclical changes in the
nation's economy. To some extent, this means that military spending can be
advantageous in that it can reduce the state economy's sensitivity to
cyclical fluctuations. For private firms this insulation--when combined
with the government's willingness to subsidize the capital costs of
developing a new product (thereby reducing the risk to the airline
company)--provides a tremendous incentive for firms to concentrate on
military rather than commercial production.
Changing markets in the commercial aircraft sector are another key
factor in California's movement away from civil production. Several years
ago, increases in fuel prices and deregulation of the airline industry led
to a change in the demand for commercial aircraft. Airlines began to demand
mid-sized, fuel-efficient planes in the face of higher fuel costs and
changing service patterns brought about by deregulation; this trend
continues today, although to a lesser extent.
Accompanying this change in demand has been the emergence of increasing
competition in the supply of both commercial and military aircraft. Tne
Japanese are the newest entrants; MIT! plans to subsidize the development of
their commercial as well as their existing military production capacity.
Furthermore. the Japanese have been extremely successful in extracting
licensing and joint production agreements which give them access to U.S.
technologies. As a result, they will eventually be able to manufacture
products completely within Japan.
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Because of heavy federal involvement as both a supplier of R&D funding
and the number one purchaser of aerospace products (the Federal Government
accounted for 70% of total 1983 aerospace sales), federal policy will
continue to shape much of California's aerospace industry. The policies
with the greatest effect will be those with a seemingly indirect connection
to military spending. Although decisions regarding the total level of
defense spending, the level and allocation of R&D funds, and the means by
which DoD contracts are let will affect California firms, their effects on
overall competitiveness will probably be marginal in California's aerospace
industry.
Policies regarding U.S. trade and research and development practices
will have more serious effects on the state. Trade policy is very important
in terms of California's ability to compete in export markets. If other
nations can continue to secure offset agreements with U.S. firms while
maintaining policies of protecting domestic markets and subsidizing the cost
of capital, it is likely they will be able to maintain existing price
advantages and continue to siphon away our technologies while building their
own ability to produce aircraft. Trade policies aimed at opening markets
and securing a 11 leve1 playing field" for competition could help to stem this
current trend.
Policies and procurement practices that relate to research and
development costs within the industry will also have a major impact on the
competitiveness of the state •s civil aircraft industry. The U.S. Department
of Commerce has stated that the most important factors in the future
competitiveness of the civil aircraft industry will be the cost and risk of
developing new products. Decisions regarding individual weapon systems will
also be critical issues because of their impact on employment. Although
California is likely to continue to capture a good portion of defense and a
majority of new space contracts, the high volatility of individual
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fewer and fewer new jobs in existing aerospace research, development, and
production.
Human resources is also an area in which California has a comparative
advantage, because of the high skill level of its labor force. In recent
years, there has been a problem with meeting the industry's need for
qualified personnel. Shortages of engineering and technical personnel
resulted because of the combined forces of the recent buildup in defense
spending and the aerospace industry's need to outbid the ~lectronics
industry for engineers and technical personnel. In the near future, it is
likely that labor market conditions will ease (except in the area of
electrical engineers), as defense spending levels off and especially if the
U.S. electronics industry continues to face weakened demand.
Financial capital has always been a source of concern to commercial
aircraft firms because development costs are so high. The cost of
developing a new model of aircraft now runs into the billions of dollars.
These high costs must be amortized over limited production runs. Thus, not
on 1y is product deve 1opment more risky, but the cost of financing the
development becomes a substantial portion of the price of finished aircraft.
Therefore, foreign firms that receive capital directly from the government
or borrow at subsidized rates have a significant cost advantage over U.S.
firms that must pay the market price for capital. Because R&D costs for
military aircraft or space projects are included in the contract fees, U.S.
firms face a strong incentive to concentrate on government contracts. An
important issue for the future will be whether domestic firms can find a way
to compete in the commercial markets in the face of growing foreign
competition that is relatively insulated from development financing costs
and the concomitant high risks. Additionally, capital availability for
commercial products may be a growing problem, as the success of Airbus
reduces the attractiveness of investing in U.S. firms, which already tend to
earn moderate to low rates of return on investment.
,'4anagement practices wi 11 be cri ti ca 1 to aerospace industry success in
the increasingly competitive environment for both military and commercial
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Table 21

CALIFORNIA AEROSPACE INDUSTRY

SIC
372
376

SIC
372

376

Total

Source:

Value Added
( $ mi 11 ions)

Productivity
Advantage

1978

1982

1978

1982

3,509.4
2,884.1

6,539.8
5,943.8

1.154
1.164

1.082
1.157

CA Share of Value Added

CA Share of Total

, 978

Em~lo.z:ment

1978

, 982

23.89%
65.73

22.17%
60.30

21.16%
57.33

20.66%
52.76

33.50%

31.72%

26.86%

26.16%

1 82

U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures, 1978 and
1982
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However, two other trends within the industry have important implications
for the
lth of the state's economy. As Figure 7 illustrates, the yearly
changes in aerospace employment indicate that the overa11 number of jobs
tends to be very volatile. For example, while California aircraft
employment declined by over 1 between 1975 and 1976, its growth rate
between 1973 and 1979 (only 3 years later) was almost 20%. This volatility
occurs because the commercial and military markets tend to be very unstable,
with demand highly sensitive to business cycles and political winds,
respectively. The nature of the airline industry is a key factor in the
volatility of demand for civil aircraft; because the demand for airline
travel is highly
lical, the aircraft industry also suffers when the
is in a recess on.
measure that is often used to assess aircraft industry
nnance is
of commercial aircraft deliveries. In the past
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large transport market of the civil aircraft industry has
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Table 22
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND NASA PRIME CONTRACT AWARDS BY STATE 1973-1983
Department of Defense Top Four States
(in Millions of Dollars}
Year
1973

State
CA
NY
TX
1>1A

1975
CA
NY
CT
TX
1977
CA
NY
TX
MA

1979
CA
NY
TX
CT
1981
CA
TX
NY
MA

1983
CA
NY
TX
VA
1984, Jan - Mar
CA
NY
r~o

MA

Source:

DoD Total
$
30,065
6,215
3,476
2,232
2,024
37,319
$
7,908
3,744
2,349
2,024
$
55,449
10,078
4,300
2, 778
2,396
$
56,653
11,674
4, 912
4,236
3, 777
$
85,880
16,629
7,416
6,481
4,596
$ 131,891
26,387
9,635
8,229
7. 072
$40,315,535
9,201,535
3,293,458
3,145,032
3,019,854

Percent
DoD Total
100%
21
12
7
5
100%
21
10
6

5
100%
22
9
6

5
100%
21
9
8
7
100%
22

NASA Total
$2,116
696
215
194
182
$2,299
1,082
204
170

State
CA
FL

co

ML

CA
TX
FL

co

Percent
NASA Total
100%
33
10

9
9

100%
47
9
7
4
100%

101

$2,882
1 ,417
237
234
196
$3,487
1,439
369
306
257

CA
TX
FL
ML
CA
FL
TX
ML
NA

49

8
8
7
100%
41
10

8
7

NA

9

8
6
100%
22
8
7
6
24.9
8.9
8.5
8.2

CA
FL
TX
ML
1984
CA
FL
TX
MD

$5,668
2t 131
774
526
408
6,142
2,150
817

587
478

100%
38
14
9

7
3~. l
13.3
9.6
5.6

Department of Defense; Directorate of Information, Operations, and
Reports; 1974-1983 data as cited in California Assembly office of
Research Briefing paper, The Impact of Defense and Aerospace
Funding on California's Economic Development, December 1984
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FIGURE 7 TOTAL AEROSPACE EMPLOYMENT IN CALIFORNIA

Figure 8 illustrates the share of commercial jet deliveries for those
regions which have developed commercial jet industries. At this time, the
United States and Europe are the only areas that produce large transport
planes. California's share of completed aircraft deliveries has decreased
steadily since the early 1970s, while the Airbus share has suddenly emerged
from zero to 18.3% since 1973. This does not indicate that European
competition has increased; instead, the Airbus consortium has emerged to
take up what has always been a fairly strong European role within the
industry. What is important for the future is the next step: how willing
are the consortium governments to make a further convni tment that wi 11 a11 ow
an already strong industry to maintain cost advantages as new, more advanced
models of aircraft are developed? And how will European success reinforce
the current trend for California producers to concentrate in military
production?
These data do not tell the full story on California's competitiveness
in commercial aircraft. A decline in the share of airplane deliveries need
not indicate that California has lost much of its production of commercial
aircraft. Even though firms may not be assembling completed planes, many
California firms are involved in the production of commercial aircraft
parts. For example, Northrop manufactures 40% of the Boeing 747, mainly the
fuselage, which it ships to Washington state by train. The interdependence
among U.S. aerospace firms means that a healthy and competitive Boeing
benefits California residents as well as those in Seattle. However, a
healthy 1•1cDonnell Douglas is likely to bring more employment benefits to
California than will subcontracts for Boeing.
The decline in California's relative share of commercial aircraft
deliveries has several causes. New models or design modifications require a
long lead time; aircraft manufacturers cannot respond to sudden changes in
the demand for planes. Therefore, in the short term, a company's success in
selling particular models is a function of variables that are outside its
control; for example, higher energy prices have been a major factor in the
recent popularity of smaller, more fuel efficient planes (such as the
r4D80). Lockheed's near failure with the L-1011 resulted in part from the
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fact that it placed its bet at the wrong time, and could not sell its
planes due to the combined factors of design problems and a severe recession
during which airlines couldn't afford new planes.
11

11

Increases in the costs of development mean that firms must sell
approximately 400 planes to break even on the cost of developing a new model
(this figure varies of course, according to the exact type of plane).
Models are not considered to be successful unless there are significant
sales and deliveries over the first 10 years and sales are significantly
above the break-even point. The Boeing 727 and DC-9 (now the MD80) are
perhaps the only clearly successful programs of the 1ast two decades; both
had sales of over 700 in the first 10 years. Even at this sales level, the
rates of return on projects tend to be 1ower than the average for all
manufacturing industries.
As airlines become less willing to purchase new aircraft and new
competitors emerge, the potential for reaching the break-even point is
reduced. Table 23 shows the total sales and profits (losses) of the three
U.S. firms producing large transports in 1971-1981. That Boeing was the
only company to make a profit during this time highlights the degree of risk
involved in producing large transports.
California•s decline in the share of commercial jet deliveries also
reflects strong incentives to specialize in military production. This
decrease will occur even though projections of the demand for civil aircraft
call for a relatively high number of bookings over the next 2 years. Since
1980, the increase in competition and level of risk has been accompanied by
a huge increase in military spending. Because the government finances
production, development, and testing costs for military hardware, firms have
an incentive to concentrate on military (rather than high-risk commercial)
production, even though military contracts also have lower-than-average rates
of return. Lockheed is basically out of the commercial aircraft business,
and even though McDonnell Douglas has been quite successful in selling its
MD80 version of its OC-9, it plans to increase its share of militaryrelated production by a significant percentage within the next few years.
California firms will continue to manufacture civil aircraft parts, however.
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AIRCRAFT SALES AND PROFITS, 1971-1987

Sales

($ bill ions)

Year

B

MD

L

1971

2.6
1.8
2.6
3.0
3.0
3.3
2.5
3.8
6.4
7.6
7.0

0.6

0
0.3
0.7
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.5
1.0
1.9

1972

1973
1974
1975
976
977
1979

rce.

u.s.
ted

1.1

1.3
L

L3
1.0

0.7
.0
2.0
2.2
2.4

rtment
Ci

Profit or loss ($millions)
B

MD

[

165

~JA

( l 71 }

119

NA

113
167
201
249

NA

( 124)
( 70)
( 49)
( 94)
( 125)
( 170)

NA
NA
NA

417

( 50)
( 60}

( 119)

611

( 56)

( 188)

678
308

( 144)
( 85)

( 199)

196

216

Commerce, "Competitive Assessment of the
l Aircraft Industry," 1982
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As for its future in civil aircraft production, California can expect
to experience continued volatility in employment due to the cyclical nature
of the demand for large transports. According to the U.S. Department of
Commerce, the extent to which foreign competition will be able to continue
to increase its share of production of both parts and final deliveries will
depend to a great extent upon the degree of technological change within the
industry. If technology remains essentially constant, U.S. firms (McDonnell
Douglas and Boeing) should continue to do fairly well. . In the face of a
complete replacement of current models--meaning a replacement of jet engines
with new propfan models currently under development by U.S. firms--U.S.
firms choosing to remain in the market (particularly Boeing) will do very
well because they have chosen to invest in the development of this new
technology. Airline industry problems leading to continuing uncertainty and
increasing competition for aircraft orders would threaten U.S. and
California market share most, because the Airbus models are the cheapest and
most efficient planes currently in production. To some extent, this
magnitude of the threat also depends on Japanese decisions as to whether to
produce planes entirely in Japan or to continue to negotiate joint
production agreements. t4aintaining the competitiveness of U.S. civil
aircraft production will benefit California, regardless of which state
delivers the planes. The key to that, and thus the most important factor to
address, is the cost and risk of developing new aircraft.
Table 24 summarizes the competitive position of Ca1ifornia•s civil
aircraft industry in regard to its foreign competitors (mainly the Airbus
Consortium). An important conclusion of this analysis is that at least in
part, California's disadvantages all relate to differences fn national
policies. Our own policies in the defense sector create large incentives to
produce (and therefore, undertake research and development) for government
rather than private markets. Industry policies in other nations place U.S.
firms at a disadvantage because they insulate their producers from business
cycles, and reduce their cost of capital below the market rates that U.S.
firms face.
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This assessment also illustrates that California has managed to
maintain its edge in those areas which provided it with an early comparative
advantage in aircraft production. Firms within the state remain leaders in
the areas of process and product technology, and our human resource skill is
still a major advantage. Management is also a strong point in the area of
commercial production because in-state firms have developed expertise in
managing complex technology projects.

Projections for the Future
The preceding discussion highlights the fact that much of California•s
aerospace industry is in a mature stage, in which increasing competition
opens the possibility for an increase in the state•s concentration in
military production, if not a loss in total employment. Providing that it
maintains the superiority of its research and education institutions and its
workforce, California•s technological edge should allow it to maintain its
existing share of aerospace employment. However, given the nature of the
industry, employment will remain volatile, especially as it becomes
increasingly dependent on military spending.
These trends are unlikely to have a major impact on the California
economy in the very short term. The recovery in the airline indus try, and
therefore strength in bookings for commercial aircraft, is expected to
continue through 1986. Military spending should not slow significantly
during that same time period, as spending appropriated during the Reagan
a~ninistration•s early buildup is still in the pipeline.
However, current
political and economic trends, as well as past experience, indicate the
possibility of a major downturn in the longer term.
Increasing competition, leading to greater internationalization of
production (in which domestic producers are involved in co-production
agreements with firms of other nations), will continue in the future,
especially in the absence of a U.S. trade policy that can address the issue
of protected overseas markets. Forecasts for a lagging economy and low
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scenario in which military spending is reduced significantly total
elimination of the MX program (16,000 California aerospace jobs) could lead
to a total loss of 55,360 jobs. Alternatively, given June 1985 employment
levels of 226,400, an across-the-board cutback of 6.9% in total aerospace
employment (similar to that experienced in the post-Vietnam period) could
result in a total job loss of 54,050.
These estimates are obviously very rough projections of the potential
impact of a defense slowdown. It may be that the political impacts of job
losses of this magnitude may in some cases be enough to prevent total
cancellation of major programs. However, the important point is that an
industry that is increasingly dependent upon military and other government
projects will be even more susceptible to employment losses of this type.
Furthermore, the result of increasing concentration in military-related
production will be to produce an industry that is increasingly unable to
compete effectively, by reinforcing existing bureaucratic structures and
management cultures. Larger aerospace firms will be unable to diversify
into nonmi 1i tary production when defense spending drops off. Furthermore,
concentration on sophisticated military systems with no or limited
commercial applications (e.g., stealth technology) may inhibit other needed
innovation at a time when California's competitiveness is especially
dependent on its ability to develop new production processes and products.
What can California do to minimize the effects that increasing
competition and the volatility of military and commercial demand have upon
employment within the state? The state's overall strategy should be to
maintain its existing share of aerospace employment while attempting to
diversify into commercially-oriented segments of the industry where growth
is taking place. Actions in the four following areas will be important in
achieving this overall goal:
(1)

Maintaining the technological and human resource superiority that
is a direct result of nationally prominent universities and
research centers. This requires continuing investment by the
state, as a means to maintain the technological edge which has in
the past been the primary reason for the states dominance in the
industry.
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Providin~ assistance for firms or workers wishing to move into
related 1ndustries. There may a1so be potential areas for new
growth in other high technology areas in which aerospace workers
or entire firms could be successful . Recent studies of the demand
for high technology workers showed considerable competition
between the aerospace and electronics industries for skilled
workers (both professional and technical), even to the extent that
a lack of skilled workers once threatened the growth of the
state's electronics industry. In times of reductions in military
spending or slow demand for civil aircraft, facilitating the
transfer of aerospace workers into industries where their
technical skills can be applied will be an important part of any
adjustment program. However, even in the absence of the immediate
need for these types of services, assistance in developing
information about potential markets and in obtaining financing are
means by which the state could play a role in assisting firms that
wish to diversify into high-technology areas outside of the
aerospace industry.

A more specific discussion of the above policies and/or programs--as
they fit in with a more comprehensive state strategy on competitiveness--is
set forth in the final section of this report. The recommendations above
fit well with programs that could address the needs of many of California's
industries. Within the context of the aerospace industry, this approach
will allow the state to maintain its current employment base, while shifting
toward firms that operate in a more competitive environment that is less
dependent on federal spending and decision-making.
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Important Trends in California•s Financial Service Industry
Four important trends that influence the future structure of the
California financial services market and the role it plays in the California
economy are discussed here.
First, federal and state deregulation has opened up this market and
will increase sources of competition for consumer and commercial clients in
the state--with or without interstate banking. California commercial banks
can expect to claim a lower share of the overall market in the state in the
future. Money center banks outside of California, as well as foreign-owned
banks, will increasingly be able to serve California through traditional and
nonbank products, such as credit cards, insurance, and brokerage services.
California consumers are reported to be less loyal to state
institutions than consumers in smaller states and will turn to providers
whose credit criteria are more generous than those of California banks.
Furthermore, while California commercial banks have an extensive branching
system, which gives them local access to customers, this is also a
significant cost not experienced by out-of-state banks, or smaller
foreign-owned banks in the state. This means that there will be pressures
on California banks to close marginal branch offices, reduce workforce, and
increase marketing of services beyond those of traditional banking to
include brokerage, real estate, insurance, data processing, and consulting.
Savings and loans are now empowered to compete against traditional
commercial banks. This will not reduce the California share of the consumer
market, but will increase the spread of market share within the state.
Although many savings and loans are financially troubled, they are generally
improving their financial stability.
Foreign-owned banks, particularly the Japanese, are becoming a
significant factor in the California market. Almost 20% of assets are now
owned by overseas banks. While control over where invesuoent of deposits
are made is not currently an issue, the profits are going overseas--not
unlike the other instances of foreign manufacturing in the United States.
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The source of value-added in the·financial sector is primarily in the
process of providing services to end users, and in the profit from loans and
investments. The health of the California consumer and commercial segments of
the economy will determine the demand for financial services. The source·of
value added to product (i.e., a financial service) will shift in the future.
There will be more reliance on electronic technology for transactions, and a
major shift in employment from face-to-face customer service to back-office
transactions and management. In reality, new products will be where
California•s value added will come from, not traditional banking services.
Finally, California• financial service industry--including those segments
not discussed here (venture finance and investment banking) have played a
critical role in enabling industry to respond to changing competitive
factors. It is here that state policy has played one of its more effective
roles--although more could be done--in helping the marketplace work.

Structure and Trends in California's Financial Services Industry
California•s depository institutions include commercial banks (which make
business, industrial and consumer loans), savings and loans {which primarily
make home loans and some other real estate loans), and credit unions (which
rnake a wide range of consumer loans).

Size of the Industry
In 1984, California's commercial banking sector included over 440
companies with 5,100 offices (Findlay Reports for California Banks).
California's share of commercial banks was 3.0% in 1984.
In 1976, there were 18 foreign-owned banks in California. Crocker bank,
purchased in 1985 by Midland Bank of England, brings the current total of
foreign-controlled banks to 29. Foreign-controlled banks had $32.2 billion in
total assets and $24.8 billion in deposits in 1984. Of California's
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California has a larger share of S&L employment and a smaller share of
credit union employment. Employment in California S&Ls has grown consistently
over the past 15 years, reaching about 70,000 workers in 1984 or almost 22% of
the national total. Nationally, S&Ls employed 106,000 people in 1970, when
California's share of the total was 14%. California credit unions employed
about 10,000 persons in 1984, or 11.8% of total U.S. credit union employment.

Assets
In 1984, California commercial banks had $231.5 billion in assets for
domestic offices and a total of $278.1 billion for both domestic and foreign
offices (Findlay Reports for California Banks). This reflects fairly steady
growth over the past 15 years. Foreign assets have represented from 20% to
30% of California bank domestic assets since 1976--around 10% above the
national average, which has grown from 15% to 25% since 1976.
California•s banks currently hold 10.8% of total U.S. domestic assets and
11.4% of combined domestic and foreign assets. California's share peaked in
1981 with a 12.0% share of domestic assets and 12.9% of combined assets.
However, a look at a purely artificial measure--bank assets per capita in the
four largest banking states in 1981--shows a somewhat different picture:
New York
Illinois
Texas
California

$15,593

10,842
9,054
8,240.

California does not have the same per capita level of bank assets as the
other three most important banking states. In part, this reflects the
importance of California's S&Ls.
California S&Ls had $252.1 billion in assets in 1984, up from
$120.5 billion in 1980. California S&L assets grew 20% from 1983 to 1984.
California's S&L share of the nation's S&L assets was 13.6% in 1970 and has
risen to 25.7% of total U.S. assets today.
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Table ?5
PROfiLE Of CALIFORNIA'S DEPOSITORY SEGMENT
OF THE FINANCIAl SERVICES INDUSTRY

Number or
Amount

1970
Percent of
National

Number or
Amount

1976
Percent of
National

1982
Number of Percent of
Amount
Nationa 1

1984
Number or Percent of
Amou'!!_
National

Commercial Banks
Companies (No.)
Offices (No.)
Total assets ($ billion)
Domestic
Domestic and foreign
Employees (No.)
Gross Profits ($ billion)

144
3,062
58.6

--

106,700
2.2

1.1'1'.

8.61
10.2

--

11.1
9.8

210
3,783
108.7
144.1
151,200
9.8

1. 5t.
8.21
10.7
12.2
12.0
11.6

360
4,904
223.1
275.5
200,800
10.7

2.5t.
9.0
11.9
12.6
13.3
12.0

440
5,100
231.5
278.1
190,000
11.2
(1983)

3.0'£
9.2
10.8
11.4
12.7
11.6
(1983)

.......
N

O"l

Savings and loans
Companies (No.)
Offices (No.)

222
896

3.91
9.0

164
2,068

3.4
12.4

171

3,241

4.51
19.4

202
3,625

6.0t.
17.3

Total assets ($billion)

32.7

18.6

69.1

17.6

153.4

21.7

252.1

27.9

Total deposits ($ billion)

25.0

17. 1

57.1

17.3

108.7

19.2

171.0

23.6

Employees (No.)
Gross profits ($ billion)

15,300
0.6

14.4
20.0

27,900

15.0

1.6

20.0

---

1,655
( 1978)
9.6

7.5

---

---

49,200
0.1

17.8
7.1

70,000
33.3
(1983)

21.8

23.9
(1983)

Credit Unions
Entities {No.)
Total assets ($ billion)
Total deposits ($)
Employees (No.)

-----

1,300

6.5

1,188

6.5

15.7

12.6

15.2

15.2

12.9

15.2

--

15.1

--

13.2

--

--

--

10,000

11.8
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Gross Profits per Employee
Gross profits per employee are a measure of productivity that is of
increasing concern during this period of financial industry restructuring.
California commercial banks generated $57,000 in gross profits per employee
in 1983 for domestic and foreign offices, up from $46,000 per employee in
1980. This 1983 level is slightly below the national figure of $60,000 per
employee for domestic and foreign offices, just as California's 1980 level
of $46,000 was slightly below the national figure of $48,000 per employee.
This difference reflects the large number of branch banks in California.
The gross profits per employee of California banks have declined from
105% of the national average in 1978 to 89% in 1983. To some extent, this
decline reflects declines in profits resulting from market shifts but it
cannot be dismissed as solely resulting from profit declines. California
banks have had difficulty in restructuring their work force to meet today's
needs.
California S&Ls generated $55,000 in gross profits per employee in
1983, down from the 1980 figure, but far better than the $2,000 per employee
in 1982. The 1983 California figure was well above the national S&L level
($45,000 per employee).

Gross Profits As a Percent of Total Assets
The gross profits of California commerci a1 banks were 4% of tota 1
assets in 1983, up from 3.7% in 1980 but below the national average of 4.1%
California S&L gross profits were 1.7% of total assets in 1983, down from
1980 out well above 1981 and 1982 and above the national average (1.7% vs
1. 5%).
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Table 26

SUMMARY OF FORCES AFFECTING FINANCE
External
Trade

Growth of the Pacific Basin markets provides an opportunity
for California•s expansion as a financial center for the
Pacific region.

Business
Cycle

High interest rates and inflation have increased competition
for deposits and the cost of providing financial products.

Federal
Policies

Deregulation has blurred the lines among financial
institutions and affected the cost of funds and services to
customers. Interstate banking will have a major effect on the
number and size of firms within the industry.

Changing
Markets

Changing demographics and increasing sophisitication among
consumers have changed the demand for financial services.

Internal
Technology

Introduction of electronic funds transfer, including ATMs,
has affected the types of services that consumers demand,
location of bank offices, human resource needs within the
industry, and cost of transactions. California banks have led
in the adoption of these new technologies.

Human
Resources

Increase in demand for workers with ability to handle
complex data processing activities. Fewer tellers needed and
more consumer service representatives with ability to
communicate sophisticated knowledge of services to customers

Financial
Capital

Higher inte1·est rates exacerbate the difficulty that small
banks have in obtaining low cost sources of funds.

Management

Increased competition in a deregulated environment requires
more innovation, enterpreneurial management with greater
attention to product differentiation, marketing, quality of
services and attention to customer need.
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These offices are for loan production and are legal if the offices do not
take deposits. Overall, the issue of interstate banking is more a question
of making competition more overt than it is one of enabling new competition.
The capacity to cross borders is confined mostly to the larger banks.
Larger money center banks (New York, Chicago) perceive the California
market as ripe for interstate banking because the California market is so
dominated by the big five banks. Their view is that they can offer more
competitive services because the existing banks are inefficient. In fact,
California's extensive branch-oriented commercial banking system is both an
advantage and a disadvantage in the new competitive market. Branches
provide a direct marketing and distribution advantage, but they also create
a large overhead and need for extensive revenue generation. California's
commercial banking industry is less productive per employee because of the
extensive branching system with its larger number of nonrevenue employees.
Banks are now closing branches and reducing their workforce to meet the
changing market conditions.
The legislation that enabled S&Ls to enter more traditional and
nontraditional banking services has had an important effect on the
performance of California's S&L industry. S&Ls have been slower than banks
to adapt to new competitive pressures, and have had a number of problems in
entering markets they were not equipped to compete in. In addition, many
S&ls diversified into (or were created to enter) specific market niches,
such as development financing, with some negative consequences.

Changing

r~arkets

The health of Ca1i.fornia's commercial banking and S&L industry has been
heavily affected by the economy, and by the past investment decisions of the
commercial and savings and loan industry. The larger commercial banks, in
particular, have been hurt by their concentration of international loans, by
loans to the now-volatile agricultural industry, and by fluctuations and
uncertainty in real estate.
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There is no doubt that foreign banks intend to capitalize on
California S strong consumer market. Japanese banks, in fact, have a market
strategy that has involved accepting lower profit in the short run to
establish their market position in the longer run. They pick a market
niche, sell their product at a low cost, and penetrate the broader market
over time, as they do in other sectors. Japanese banks are specializing in
working with state and local governments in industrial revenue bond
finance. They have also been actively involved in providing stand-by
letters of credit to back bank obligations of municipal governments.
1

The larger context of Japanese banking is the strategic rationale of
having available in the United States credit capability for those Japanese
firms that are or will be manufacturing here or warehousing
inventory--whether they are producers, suppliers or buyers of Japanese
products. The reason for this stems from the social role played by banks in
Japan. The 11 Zaibatsu 11 structure of interlocking ownership and industrial
collaboration among Japanese firms motivates banks to locate abroad so that
they can provide both credit and related services to their firms as they
penetrate new markets. Banks such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sanwa, Sumitomo,
are all part of this network of Japanese banks and industry. Acquiring
California banks is important because it enables more effective sales and
production in California high-technology and consumer product markets.
While having banks in target country markets is not essential to trade
and manufacturing, it is convenient. The importance of concentrating U.S.
deposits in the U.S. headquarters of foreign owned banks is that a deposit
base enables a foreign business to more easily establish letters of credit
and IMke trade arrangements. In general, companies like to be close to the
market they are entering and, once there, tend to use banks that are
familiar wfth their business and credit needs. Thus, the deposit
concentration in foreign-owned banks suggests the creation of a U.S.
platform for business finance in the leading economic communities of the
California market (e.g., San Francisco, Los Angeles).
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The S&l industry has been the most affected by deregulation and the
larger market shifts. Their traditional portfolio of long-term loans at
fixed rates and regulatory constraints on interest paid did not permit them
to become competitive during the period when interest rates rose and clients
shifted their deposits from passbook savings to accounts bearing higher
interest. Once they were able to enter new markets, few S&ls could move
rapidly to compete with banks, or other financial industry service firms.
Deregulation--nationally and within California--permitted more
competitive strategies. One attractive strategy for S&Ls was to invest in
real estate development. Some real estate developers bought small S&Ls and
used deposit brokers to find more depositors. The deposits were then used
to finance real estate development. Unfortunately, several of these
development-bank S&Ls found their net worth wiped out when one or more
projects failed. This problem has also hurt other S&ls diversifying into
the commercial real estate field.
The need to compete pushed S&Ls to offer higher interest rates and to
devise new types of loans to offset them, such as the variable rate and
adjustable interest loan. However, the volatility of interest rates over
time places an unusual stress on consumers--particularly the negative
amortization type of loan. As a result, S&Ls are concerned about the
potential for future loan defaults as well as potential cash shortages if
interest rates decline significantly.
Federal regula tors have taken over or ordered new management for
several California S&ls in the past year. All S&Ls face higher insurance
premiums for deposits insured by the S&L system. Foreclosures have gone up
GOO%; reserves are down to $3 per $100 of liabilities and many S&Ls have
found their net worth cut in half. Profit has dropped 75%. About 20% of
California S&Ls generate almost 95% of S&l profits. Unless the structure of
the system changes, high FSLIC insurance costs are likely to continue and to
be directly passed to consumers. While there is some pressure to return the
S&L system to its original home loan focus, and away from becoming Second
class" commercial banks, the issue is not likely to be resolved in the near
term. California S&Ls, while facing some continuing difficulties in
competing, are improving their position.
11
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lowering accounts receivable (there is no float on debited funds) reducing
transaction costs (including interbank transfers) and reducing exposure to
fraud (bad checks are avoided and fraudulent credit cards cannot be used,
although the problem of stolen cards remains).
"Smart cards" will be entering the market within the next few years as
well and may be part of the debit card product made available to consumers.
Smart cards are credit cards with microprocessors built in. They can store
information, calculate transactions, and authorize purchases, as well as
improve credit card security. Smart cards are being test marketed in Europe
and in some U.S. areas.
Videotex is a computer-based system for carrying out sales transactions
that is expected to increase in availability over the next 5 years as more
TV cable systems offer two-way operation. However, competition between
satellite dish communications and cable systems may slow this process
somewhat. Individuals will be able to subscribe to cable connections with
computerized transaction systems and will be able to review products and
conclude sales, including paying bills and making related bank
transactions. Home banking and sales of related financial service products,
such as insurance in the home will be feasible as a result of this
technology. Several of the large banks in California are test marketing
home banking at the present time. Telephone banking is already available in
most California consumer markets. Simpler than computer home banking, but
relatively similar, telephqne banking permits consumers to pay bills by
punching in the numbers on a touch-tone telephone.
TI1e impact of the increasing range of electronic transactions on
competitiveness and employment in the California depository institutions
sector is not known. The number of employees required for traditional
transactions (e.g., tellers) is likely to diminish. The number of more
skilled employees required to manage operating systems is likely to
increase. There is no way to determine how (or if) the long-term growth in
electronically based marketing (through computers and television) will
affect employment in telemarketing and customer service. Currently,
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California commercial banks have more employees than the national
average because of the extensive statewide branching system, which requires
headquarters employees not engaged in banking. While California has 6% of
banking companies it has 12.7% of employees. As a result, California bank
financial performance and productivity are slightly below the national
average. Since 1981, the number of employees has been decreasing by about
5,000 workers annually; the reduction can be expected to continue for at
1east one more year and perhaps up to three more years. Bank of America has
let go over 7,000 workers since 1982 and Crocker has dropped 2,000; other
large banks have followed. Some of the loss in employees may be at least
partly offset by hiring for the new financial services banks are offering.
However, there are no data on how much (or whether) prior layoffs have been
offset by growth in new financial services.
A critical issue in commercial banking is how successful they can be in
shifting existing employees to emerging service areas, such as real estate
brokerage, securities, insurance, management consulting and data
processing. Fundamental to maintaining employment is upgrading basic
reading, writing, and communications skills of employees. This is a serious
problem at the subsupervisory level. California's banking employees include
a significant number of Hispanic and Asian workers. An SRI study of three
banks showed a range of 25% to 72% Hispanic and Asian.
The causes of low skill levels relate to low salaries, recruitment
practices (referral), screening and selection processes, lack of incentives,
and limited tr·aining opportunities. The problem is made ~wrse by
supervisory difficulties with employees from different cultura 1
backgrounds. The Bank of America is using the Californid ~orker Employment
Training program (CWETA) to retrain employees in-house and thus avoid
1ayoffs. This is a creative approach to sharing the cost for mai ntai ni ng
employment {the bank contributes to the state unemployment insurance fund,
but has rarely discharged employees until recently). However, the overall
problem is so large as to require far more. A consortium of banks in the
San Francisco Bay Area is now examining how they can work more effectively
with community colleges to develop needed curricula and programs for
retraining and skills upgrading.
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The number of troubled S&ls in California is increasing. While the
business was "heaven on earth" in the 1960s and 1970s, S&Ls were
ill-equipped to deal with the changes in the economy and in regulation that
came in the 1980s. California's S&Ls have recovered from the dramatic
collapse of 1981-1982, although there are 5% fewer S&Ls than before. The
decrease came largely through an ongoing process of merger and acquisition.
However, the number of firms has increased since 1982, and the number of
offices has continued to climb. There has been a 300% increase in the
number of S&L offices since 1970. Neither the decrease in the number of
California S&Ls nor the increase in the number of offices has reached the
national ~verage, however. California had 3.9% of the nation's S&Ls in 1970
and in 1984.
California •s larger S&Ls have moved aggressively into out-of-state
aquisitions. Seven California S&Ls had 410 out-of-state branches in 1984.
Companies such as Home Savings and American Savings have been able to
acquire selected (troubled) S&Ls in Ohio, Missouri, Florida, Texas, and
Arizona, avoiding the more insolvent companies that are now plaguing some
state governments.
Even when the industry has been struggling, California S&Ls were doing
better than the national average. This is largely due to the fact that more
California S&Ls are publicly held, rather than being mutual associations.
California S&Ls had 23.9% of the nation's gross profits in 1983, below the
1980 peak of 37.6% but good considering the hard times. Gross profits as a
percent of assets were 113% of the nation's average in 1983, and have
usually been 6% to 18% above the national average for the past 15 years.
Credit unions, while a small part of the depository institutions in
California, have good potential for expansion because of their employee- and
association-related market contacts. Credit unions have decreased in number
and lost 1% of market share nationally over the past decade. Deposits have
grown to $14.4 billion, which is 13.2% of the national total. Per employee
assets have been higher than the national average.
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continued state involvement with the financial services industry in
education and retraining initiatives.
S&l industry nationally and within the state is still undergoing a
process of adjustment and shakeout to the changing financial services
market. California's S&ls, overall, are doing better than those in the rest
of the country. The larger question is the overall viability of the S&L
business in the United States. Will it have to return to specializing in
home mortgages or wi 11 S&Ls become second-class commercial banks? These
issues, layered on top of the generally less sophisticated management style
of S&ls, wi1l make successful performance increasingly difficult for the
state's industry.
Credit unions may be a suprise factor in the financial services
industry in California. Credit unions affiliated with affluent and
expanding employment areas (such as the professional segment of Silicon
Valley) are expanding and have a strong base for competition in consumer
credit, home improvement loans, and auto loans. They might be expected to
sh0\'1 some growth, but will still be small relative to the overall financial
services industry in the state.

Financing California Enterprise
The health and adaptiveness of California's financial service industry
pl
a broad and important role in the competitiveness of the rest of the
state's industry. This role concerns, primarily, the commercial finance
segment of commercial banking, but it also includes industries not discussed
earlier, including venture capital finance and investment banking. The
importance of the ro1e of California's financial services industry is
described below, followed by a review of innovations in finance where
banks--as
result of deregulation ana roore competitive finance industry
environment--are likely to play an even greater role in the future.
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The Expanding Stage
By the time an industry moves into the expanding stage, it has shown
early signs of long-term viability and has started to generate revenues.
Typically, the expanding stage begins with unsustainably rapid rates of
growth in sales, which later taper off to more moderate rates of long-term
growth. Expanding industries in the high-growth phase include the software
segment of the information services industry, aerospace, and tourism.
Rapid growth shifts a group of high-risk start-up ventures toward
becoming a large, established, maturing, low-risk industry. At first, the
expanding industry is supported by second-tier financing from venture
capital providers, by trade credit, and by finance companies whose close
monitoring and heavily collateralized loans are well suited to both high
growth and relatively risky financing. Investment funds and investment
bankers enter into the expanding stage as well, with private placements to
selected investors and with initial public offerings of stock. As growth
becomes more reliable, the industry becomes a mainstream user of capital
from traditional sources such as banks and money markets.

The Transforming Stage
The transforming stage of the industry life-cycle introduces great
uncertainty into the industry's financial requirements. Markets become
saturated, competition intensifies, margins become thin, and the industry
casts about for ways to survive. During this stage, companies follow one of
three strategies: acceptance of decline and failure; dematuration and
consolidation into a tighter, more focused industry; or transformation into
a different industry.
Very few firms simply roll over and die. The vast majority respond to
adversity with renewed energy and a burst of resourcefulness. Companies
that choose to demature continue to serve the same markets but make massive
changes in their internal structure, stripping away excess capacity,
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Attitudes--The willingness of investors to place funds depends in
part on how the MidArnerican region is perceived as a whole, how the
industry is viewed, and the type of investment.
A wide variety of capital providers serve California. These include
intennediary institutions {banks, thrifts, finance companies, insurance
companies, investment funds}, brokers C'deal makers" of various kinds who
arrange transactions), and direct investors or lenders (who risk their own
funds).
Capital providers concentrate on specific lines of business lending,
investment, or brokerage. Without exception, however, all providers place
funds based on their assessment of individual company situations; none \lill
risk funds solely on the basis of industrywide or regional aggregate
information. Programs to augment an industry's capital access must,
therefore, enhance the individual company's ability to manipulate one or
more of the five components identified above.
Even today, when most financial services companies are expanding into
each other's traditional lines of business, each capital provider tends to
concentrate in certain financial markets according to the risk
characteristics and the tenure (duration) of their investments and loans.

Obtaining Capital to Meet California's Needs
Traditional forms of financing are increasingly inadequate, and
financial innovations are needed. Fortunately, the U.S. financial community
is in the most creative and innovative period of its history. The financial
industry in California has exhibited surprising creativity, and the
cdpital-hungry industries themselves are becoming increasingly sophisticated
and innovative.
Capital dvailability for California can be provided through public and
private innovations aimed at overcoming barriers to access as described
below.
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Enhancing Return on Investment
Returns to the investor or lender can be enhanced through revenue
increases, cost decreases, tax advantages, or approaches that increase the
certainty (or
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warrants in return for lower interest and longer terms), and various forms
of flexible interest rate structures (interest rate swaps, interest rate
futures, and use of various ceilings, floors, front-end fees, deferred
income, and performance-linked repayment approaches).

Improving Channels of Access
Relationships with financial institutions are often the key to.
acquiring needed finance. Innovation in access channels is just beginning.
Industry and government can work with clients to shape financial instruments
more creatively, mixing different sources and terms to meet client needs.
In some cases, the government can have a strong role in this area of
; nnovation. Federa 1 and state government 1oan programs frequently pro vi de
partial or complete financing help to leverage private debt. Statesponsored venture capital funds, financed either by general revenues or by
bonds, and capital from state employee retirement/pension funds are being
used to increase the availability of capital in more than 20 states. States
are increasingly working through privately managed venture funds as well as
running their own enterprises. However, California has such a strong
venture capital industry (i.e., a sufficient amount of venture financing
targeted to investments in the state) that this type of policy may not be
necessary, at this time.
Governments are also enabling and sponsoring new financial
intermediaries, such as development finance companies, that take public and
private capital and leverage the funds by making mixed debt and equity
placements. Portions of these investments are often guaranteed and resold
(through the SBA program, for example). California was the first state to
enable formation of Business Industrial Development Companies (BIDCOs) to
perform this function. California legislation has served as a general model
for other states.
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Improved channels of access can help California firms at all
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packaging and brokering, and initial stock issue underwriting. California
is active in some phases of business loan preparation. In some instances
government may find that "incubators .. that provide a continuum of business
services and information for start-up firms can reduce financial needs and
improve survival rates in emerging industries. Venture finance companies
are increasingly in the "incubation" business, helping first to finance new
firms with venture capital and then to nurture them through their early
development. Technology centers, sponsored by states, universities, and
sometimes businesses alone, are becoming a popular means of helping
companies gain access to information on technology and markets.
Information on capital markets is always important, but it is most
critical to emerging California enterprises that are uncertain what
financial sources are appr.opriate for them. For emerging industries--both
those just starting out and those passing into the first- or second-tier
venture financing stage--finding both interested investors and help in
business planning is very important. This is true even for some firms with
venture financing, such as new participants in software, biotechnology,
robotics, and health services. Such firms have often given up significant
equity to gain initial financing and, as a result, have difficulty in
finding sources for their next level of debt or equity.
Information, however, can be equally critical to mature, midsized
industries that require levels of capital beyond what their traditional
lenders can provide. Assistance in finding investors--for equity
investments or mergers and acquisitions--might be critical to completing the
process of transformation in industries such as industrial machinery or
specialty chemicals.

Mobilizing Capital Markets
The capital needed to finance the continuing transformation of the
California economy is available in the global capital market. The problem
is mobilizing both suppliers and users of capital to consider new approaches
to meeting the finance needs.
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In part, the successful transformation of the banking and securities
industries into an integrated financial services sector (as discussed
earlier) 11 be measured by their response to changing demands for
capital. However, the current economic and competitive climate has, at
least temporarily, made financial institutions far more conscious of risk,
profit margins, and short-term returns on investment. As a result, despite
growing competition in financial services and increasing pressures to
transform, the industry may not take the initiative in exploring alternative
approaches to nancing industrial development. The innovative financial
techniques described in this report constitute a menu of options that can be
used, under the right circumstances, to improve capital access. There is
clearly a basis for collaboration among the public sector, private industry,
and the financial community to encourage use of these approaches, but the
shared interests of industry, federal and state governments, and the capital
markets need to be better articulated.
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In recent years, states have started to recognize that they can respond
directly to the constraints on capital markets by helping lenders and
investors to reduce risks, increase return, improve channels of access,
enhance information, and change investor attitudes toward investment.
Accordingly, they are addressing capital market constraints by redefining
their financial industry regulatory policies and industry finance programs.
This appears to the most appropriate form for California as well.
States that make direct subsidies are concentrating their subsidies
more often on R&D tax credits and new capital tax credits and on incentives
related to job generation by new firms. Clearly, subsidies of bank lending,
through linked-deposits programs, for example, are useful in targeting
subsidies to specific industries that are in particular difficulty. But
these approaches, in the end, are only temporary measures that must be
complemented by larger reforms in industry finance.
Subsidies of industry cannot replace improving the efficiency of the
capital market. Increased efficiency, ultimately, is a consequence of
providing better rMrket information, carefully modified financial industry
regulations (interstate banking), creation of new financial instruments, and
strategic incentives of public funds such as pension investments. Achieving
this will require increased collaboration among industry, government, and
capital markets. While California is ahead of most states in terms of
introduction of innovations in regulation, productive changes are still
needed and can be accomplished only if all three sectors have a shared
agenda.
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Table 27
SUI~t-1ARY

OF ACTIONS NEEDED FOR KEY CALIFORNIA INDUSTRIES
Element

Value added production Worker productivity

Expanded markets

Industry

Agriculture

Value added products

High tech
PROCESS TECHNOLOGY
Manufacturing

New management skills

FOR£IGN MARKETS

Engineering skills

New markets

FLEXIBLE MANUFACTURING Skills retraining
Basic
AND UESIGN
r1anufacturi ng

Import
substitution

Aerospace

Process technology

Engineering skills

COMf4ERCIAL
MARKETS

Finance

Automation technology

Skills retraining

PACIFIC BASIN
i~AHKET$

Note:

Capital letters indicate priority actions for each industry.
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intelligence, and software is in a prime position to become a center for the
development of increasingly sophisticated CIM. (An example of this
potential is the recent joint venture between Measurex, a $160 million
Silicon Valley software firm, and Ford r~otor Company to deveiop a software
system to link Ford's current "islands of automation .. on the factory floor.)
The leadership in moving toward new horizons in advanced manufacturing
must clearly reside with the private sector. Business must make the
investments and strategic decisions necessary to develop and adopt new
manufacturing process technologies. To capture the real opportunity in
flexible manufacturing and computer-integrated manufacturing systems,
California will need to move aggressively because others have targeted this
same opportunity; including Japan and states of the industrial f4idwest
(e.g., Michigan).
The state government can make critical investments to help stimulate
this development building on its current strengths through the state's
universities. Working in partnership with the private sector, the state
can help build the necessary technology infrastructure or capacity that can
help the private sector move ahead in this area. California has the
opportunity to draw on its existing strengths in its universities and
federal laboratories in making manufacturing technology more accessible to
industry. Possible steps include the following:
Create Centers for r•1anufacturin Com etitiveness as
umverslty 1n ustry consort1um partnersh1ps to provide applied
technology for industries in the development and adoption of new
manufacturing/process technologies. Models of jointly funded
technology centers have already been developed with the University
of California in areas of microelectronics (MICRO at UC Berkeley)
and magnetic tape· (UC San Diego}. New emphasis is needed in the
applications of technology to advanced manufacturing. For example,
the Ben Franklin Partnership Program in Pennsylvania provides state
matching grants for applied technology centers at state universities
focused on such areas as robotics and computer aided design and
manufacturing. Participating firms in private industry share in the
funding and determine what app 1 i ed research is conducted.
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firms. The state's role is to act primarily as a catalyst to help the
private sector gain access to the most useful research and applications in
advanced technology. Clearly, the process of adopting new manufacturing
technologies must be industry-driven, based on the needs of individual firms
to become more competitive. The state can, however, play an important role
in helping firms gain access to what is available from public universities
and federal facilities and in encouraging innovative joint action in this
area.

Enhancing Worker Productivity
In addition to new technologies, the key to increasing manufacturing
competitiveness is enhancing worker productivity and flexibility. In fact,
investments in increasing flexibility in manufacturing must be complemented
by investment in increasing skills and flexibility in the work force.
Workers need new skills to operate and maintain new-techno1ogy equipment.
The growth of new industries and the decline of older industries will
require worker adaptability and retraining. Worker motivation and
commitment will remain the cornerstone of productivity and thus efforts will
be needed to ensure increased participation in the workplace. Therefore, an
equal commitment to investments in human resources will be required to match
the required investment in new technologies.
California industry faces a choice in how to compete based on its human
resources. One approach is to focus on cutting human resource cost, the
other approach is to increase human resource quality. Given the lower wage
rates of our foreign competitors, competing through the the first approach
will result in the loss of jobs and reduction in our standard of living. To
compete and maintain our standard of living, California must focus on human
resource quality, not simply cost. This requires investing in worker
skills, (including communication, literacy, and numeracy skills) retraining
employees for more complex tasks, and adopting new technologies in a way
that allows workers to work creatively with machines to improve products and
manufacturing processes.
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Labor market matching--As rapid changes in industry and technologies
create more structural employment change, more attention must be
given to mechanisms that increase the efficiency of labor market
matching. Both government and business need to invest in local
labor market information sharing that will enhance the mobility of
the workforce. Government employment programs, including the state
employment service, need to provide assistance to workers in gaining
job search skills. Efforts to create new labor market matching
efforts in the Bay Area and Los Angeles need to be encouraged by the
state as an important way to address a competitiveness issue.
Employee incentives--Innovative management must place a strong
emphasis on creating employee incentives for high quality
performance and commitment. These include encouraging the adoption
by the private sector of employment security policies that promote
growing opportunity for employees to continue in employment in a
firm, if they are willing to accept changes of assignment.
Incentive stock options and employee stock ownership plans should be
encouraged to reward individual employees and strengthen the link
between pay and performance.
Linking investments in. new manufacturing technologies and human resources
skills is critical for moving toward higher-value-added production. These
activities need to be planned in partnership with the private sector as part
of California's overall strategic plan for the future.

Expanding Markets
Creating the capacity to produce more competitively is half the
battle. Aggressively marketing value-added products is also required.
Agriculture in California provides the important lessons--it is not enough
to focus on production, it is also critical to promote new markets.
Expanding trade is especially important for agriculture, aerospace, and high
technology manufacturing. While the value of the dollar, trade practices,
and federal policy clearly determine the overall shape of export markets
(and California should be aggressive in making sure that its views on these
issues are well known in Washington), much can be done at the state level to
promote new markets and find profitable niches. At the same time, because
California itself has become a major market that is served by industries
outside the state, import substitution is an important stategy for
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Lobbyinf Washington on trade issues--The state interest in trade,
especia ly with the rising Pacific Basin markets, is too critical to
the state•s economy to be left to Washington alone. California must
make its presence known in Congress and in the Executive Branch to
promote its i
tin trade. This might be accomplished by
creating a special California Trade Office in Washington
Ex~ort promotion through state-sponsored trade missions, trade
of ices in key foreign countries, and finance assistance for medium
and small businesses. While large firms may not need much
state-level help, smaller firms can profit by assistance from the
state--helping to provide infonnation, making contacts, and
providing some financial help. A major focus of export promotion
should be California's comparative advantage as the "Gateway to the
Pacific " targeting efforts toward the growing Pacific Basin
markets. While California has become more active in this area
through its new export financing legislation, activities of the
World Trade Commission, and the California Economic Development
Corporation 1 s Pacific Basin Task Force, much more can be done to
develop focused state effort in this area. Opportunities may exist
to join with some other Western states to jointly market products in
the Pacific Basin.

Imeort substitution through focused state efforts on a regional
basis. Regional economic clusters create demands for support
iers that are often met by firms outside the
information on the types of services and
industries in the region can be an important
entrepreneurs. The state can also sponsor--in
regional private or public organizations--special
rd li
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can be built through a partnership between the public and private sector.
;.Joving forward on this strategy requires several initial steps:
Shared vision--Leaders in industries facing competitive threats and
concerned state government leaders need to join together in
formulating a shared vision of promoting competitiveness. Some
possible elements for that shared vision have been suggested in this
report.
Action program--Using that shared v1s1on as a base, leaders need to
develop a specific action program that includes actions to be taken
by both the private and public sectors. This action program should
be developed through discussion and negotiations that include
1eaders from each sector.
·
com etitiveness monitorin --Better mechanisms are needed to
mon1tor tren s 1n compet1t1veness on an ongoing basis and assess
results of new initiatives.
State capacity in competitiveness--The legislature should take
advantage of existing committees with jurisdiction over key areas
related to competitiveness or, if necessary, consider creating one
or more new committees to hold hearings, review proposals, and
monitor developments in this area. Such committees could also
analyze key legislation from the standpoint of its expected impact
on competitiveness. The Administration should focus the activities
of state agencies on this issue and assess the impact of all state
actions in the area of competitiveness.
In summary, major attention should be focused on competitiveness as an
issue critical to the future of the state; private leaders should be
involved in the development of a major program in this area; and, where
necessary, new public and private institutions should be established to give
this issue the visibility that it deserves.
urgently, steps need to be take immediately to build a consensus
among leaders from key industries facing competitive threats and state
government leaders concerning the need for action. Consensus development
should be stimulated through discussions across the state, focusing on what
each sector can do to help promote manufacturing innovation, worker
productivity, and expanding markets. Building a coalition for
competitiveness in California that involves leaders from major industries is
essential for moving ahead in this critical area.
i~ost
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